Despite initiating the war, Argentina had not prepared a plan for the subsequent defence of the islands. The
military dictatorship that governed the country at the time regarded the seizure of the Falklands as a political act to obtain a diplomatic bargaining position, and not as an act of war. Consequently they were taken by surprise when the British responded with a large-scale mobilization, and a task force to retake the islands.[1]
The
Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina; FAA), which had never fought against an external enemy since its establishment in 1912, had never considered the possibility of waging a long-range naval air campaign against a major
NATO power. It was not trained or equipped for such a mission. The FAA had only two
tanker aircraft to serve the whole air force and navy, and its fighter-bomber
Mirage IIIs and
IAI Daggers were not equipped for
aerial refuelling. The FAA's training, tactics and equipment were focused on a possible war against
Chile, resulting from disputes such as the
Beagle conflict.[1][2]
The option to attack Chile[3] was a cause of great concern to the Argentina military during the war. The
Chilean armed forces had deployed a significant force to Chile's common border with Argentina, and the FAA was forced to reinstate their retired
F-86 Sabres to bolster Argentina's air defences.[4] In Argentina's favour,
Peru immediately offered its support to the Argentine cause, with the
Peruvian Air Force even offering to fly combat missions. This was politely declined by the Argentine government. As the war progressed, Peru and
Venezuela sent critical aircraft spare parts to Argentina, urgently needed by the FAA and the
Brazilian Air Force leased two
EMB111 Bandeirantes maritime patrol aircraft to the Argentine Navy.[5] Finally on June 4, ten Peruvian
Mirage 5 with
AS-30 missiles arrived to
Tandil but the war ended before they could be used.[6]Israel Aircraft Industries technicians that were in the country under the 1979
IAI Daggers contract continued their work during the conflict.[7]
By the best estimates, Argentina had about 240 planes when the war broke out. About half of those were posted in the interior and along the Chilean border.[8] The long distances from their bases prevented them from using their top speed or they risked running out of fuel.[9][n 1] Although the Argentines had more aeroplanes than the British Task force, a good number of them were Pucara turboprops.[10][n 2] Also, the A-4 Skyhawk force were dependent on the two available KC-130 tankers, limiting the number of aeroplanes which could attack simultaneously.[11]
Argentina's fleet of
A-4 Skyhawk attack jets was in very poor condition. The arms embargo placed by the United States in 1976, due to the "
Dirty War", had made most airframes unusable. The involvement of Israel in helping to return the A-4 to full operational status has been alleged, but has never been confirmed.[12]
The small
air arm of the Argentine Navy (Armada Republica Argentina; ARA) was in the middle of the transition from the A-4Q Skyhawk to the new
Super Etendard. Only five of the Etendard's anti-ship
Exocet missiles had been delivered at the time of the conflict, at which point an arms embargo prevented the delivery of further shipments. Additionally, the required programming for the missiles to interact with the Etendard's computers had not been completed by French engineers when the conflict broke out. France, being an ally of the United Kingdom, recalled all technicians, which left Argentine scientists and electronic engineers to figure out a way to make the missiles take input from the plane's computers. Navy pilots, particularly those of the 3rd Naval Fighters Squadron flying A-4Qs, were the only personnel trained in bombing warships. Air Force pilots trained during April against the two Argentine
Type 42 destroyers, similar to those of the British Fleet, and according to the Naval officers all the sorties were shot down, causing great concern to the High Command until the successful May 1 strikes which proved that aircraft could survive.[12][13]
Finally, Argentine military aviation had never been involved in an international conflict, indeed the last time the Argentine military had been involved in an international conflict was the
War of the Triple Alliance more than a century before.
In spite of these disadvantages, Argentine air units bore the brunt of the battle during the six-week war, and inflicted serious damage and losses to the naval forces of the United Kingdom. Low-flying jets attacking British ships provided some of the most sobering and dramatic images of the war. By the end of the conflict, the British forces had come to admire the FAA's spirited conduct in the face of an effective air defence network.[14][n 3] Admiral
Sandy Woodward, the British Task Force commander said: "[t]he Argentine Air Force fought extremely well and we felt a great admiration for what they did."[15]
The British Operational Research Branch Report declassified and released to the public in February 2013 states:
The Argentine air arms conducted a 10 week campaign during which time they carried out air supply of their forces in the Falkland Islands, reconnaissance of UK forces in the South Atlantic, and engaged units of TF317. Though they sustained considerable damage, it is fair to say that their air forces were not beaten and remained as a viable force at the end of hostilities. The 4 air arms (ndlr:
FAA,
COAN,
CAE,
PNA ) were, within their own spheres, generally capable and well organised, though limited in
AAR and
reconnaissance assets. A lack of aircraft spares may also have limited their effectiveness. Of the 3 facets of operations, the Argentine air arms are considered to have been successful in the air supply of their forces, only partially successful in the reconnaissance task, and to have inflicted significant attrition on UK naval forces. No militarily significant success was achieved against UK land forces ashore.[16]
Organisation
The air units involved in the Falklands War were under the following
chain of command:
Air Defence Command (
Spanish: Comando Aéreo de Defensa) – Brigadier
Jorge Hughes was in charge of the radar network, Mirage IIIEA interceptors and anti-aircraft defences on the mainland.
Strategic Air Command (
Spanish: Comando Aéreo Estratégico) - Brigadier Helmuth Weber. Coordinated air assets through all the country. The CAE also had the main role of long range maritime surveillance with Boeing 707s and C-130 Hercules.
Southern Air Force (
Spanish: Fuerza Aérea Sur) – Brigadier
Ernesto Crespo. The FAS was the main organisation involved in combat over the conflict zone.
South Atlantic Military Theatre (
Spanish: Teatro Operaciones Atlantico Sur) - Vice Admiral
Juan Lombardo. Basically a
naval command with the role of coordinating the air, surface and submarine assets in the South Atlantic area. Initially, during the
invasion of the islands on 2 April and before hostilities broke out, the islands were supposedly to be under their command and was considered as the only organisation needed to manage the crisis.
Falklands Military Garrison (
Spanish: Guarnicion Militar Malvinas) - Brigade General
Mario Menéndez (
Army)
Air Component (
Spanish: Componente Aéreo) - Brigadier Luis Castellano
Deployment
Air units moved from home bases to southern facilities. Amid fears about British/Chilean air strikes and/or
SAS raids, Argentine aircraft were dispersed in the surrounding areas of their southern airfields, e.g., several parts of the national route #3 were used for this purpose.
The numbers in bold are the number of aircraft engaged in combat without counting those in reserve, the numbers in brackets are the number of aircraft lost during the war.
AS 30 air-surface missiles. Supplied by the
Peruvian Air Force and arriving at the
Tandil AFB (home base of the FAA Dagger) at the end of May, the war ended before they could be used.[citation needed]
Unguided retarded
Gravity bomb: Thirteen bombs[21] hit British ships without detonating as they were dropped from very low altitude and there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. The problem was solved by June with new fuzes (Kappa) bought in Spain [citation needed].
US built
Mark 82 Snake Eye (500 lb / 227 kg) : A-4Q
British built "1000 lb" (450 kg) : A-4B/C, IAI Daggers and Canberras
Spain built Expal BR/BRP 250 kg : A-4B/C and IAI Daggers
133 sorties by the A-4B and 86 by the A-4C. They flew with unreliable
ejection seats due to the US embargo placed from 1977. Naval A-4Q performed 12 sorties. They were highly dependent on the two available KC-130 tankers, limiting the number of aeroplanes that could attack simultaneously.
153 sorties against naval/ground targets by the two squadrons. Their lack of
aerial refueling capacity severely affected their performance without any chance of manoeuvring over the islands. They were obliged to fly the shortest flightpath and had less than 10 minutes to find their targets. The discovery of their approach corridor by the British led to 7 aircraft being shot down by Sea Harriers
CAP, something just realized when one of the downed Dagger pilots was recovered by own troops. By the end of May they began carrying an improvised
chaff dispenser consisting of aluminium strips inside their airbrakes.
Total Sorties:
The above figures shown a total of 430 attack sorties from the mainland of which 18 aircraft were intercepted by the Sea Harriers and another 14 were shot down by anti aircraft defences.
Argentine sources indicate that a number were withdrawn from operations over the islands to protect the mainland against
Vulcan strikes,[2][n 6][23]
[n 7][24][n 8] however, they made 58 sorties providing decoys for the strike units with particular success on the June 8 attacks against the British landings ships.[25] Their lesser internal fuel capacity, compared to the Daggers, prevented them from being used in their escort role.
The unarmed airliner made 54 cargo flights and other 61 for reconnaissance and surveillance duties[26] against the British Task Force heading southFAA map locating the fleet for the first time on April 21 when a
Sea Harrier attempted to intercept the 707 on May 22 causing it to retreat. Another 707 managed to evade 4 Sea Dart missiles launched against it but the risk of further sorties was too great and from that point on the 707's made no further attempt to find the Task Force.[27] On another occasion they made a casual encounter with a British
Nimrod both unarmed aircraft looked each other over and continued their missions.
Two aircraft were incorporated into the naval aviation on May 21. They flew 39 maritime patrol sorties from Rio Gallegos airbase. They were returned to the Brazilian air force on June 24[28]
They performed reconnaissance and ground attack missions from the Falklands airfields and surveillance of the
Patagonian coast from bases in Southern Argentina. Most of the island-based Pucarás were destroyed on the ground, due to special forces actions. They shot down a Royal Marines
Westland Scout during the
battle of Goose Green.
126 decoying plus 52 reconnaissance sorties. They were also extensively used as communications relay and pathfinder flights to guide the combat jets with the
Learjets' superior navigation systems.
33 night flights to BAM Puerto Argentino in May/June (Blockade runner). Among the cargo transported in those flight were the 602 Army Commandos Coy, 155 mm CITEFA cannons, an
improvised land based Exocet launcher, the
Roland SAM system and a
RASIT radar replacement. They evacuated 263 wounded and a British
PoW in their returning flights. Starting 15 May, they also took over the dangerous task of searching for naval targets for the strike units, after the retirement of the last
SP-2H Neptune available. On one of these daylight missions, a Hercules was intercepted and shot down by a Sea Harrier. 29 May, the British tanker British Wye was hit by bombs dropped by a Hercules, north of South Georgia[29](Not officially recognized by the FAA)
KC-130 Hercules
Refueling sorties for A-4s and Super Étendards, also for battle damaged fighters.
15 night flights to BAM Puerto Argentino in May/June (Blockade runner)
Army Aviation
796 helicopter flights on the islands
1st Air Brigade Construction Group Air Force
In charge of maintaining Port Stanley airbase operable. Throughout the conflict, the airport installations were attacked with 237 bombs, 1,200 shells from the Royal Navy gunline and 16 missiles, however, it was never out of action entirely. Many sources claim that the runway was covered with piles of dirt during the day causing British intelligence to surmise that repairs were still in progress.[2] Craters were in fact heaps of earth placed there to make it look as though the runway was damaged.[30] In fact, the British were well aware that the runway was still in use by C-130[31] and attempted to interdict these flights leading to the loss of a C-130 on June 1.[32]
12 air crew (6 on C-130H shot down June 1, 4 on Learjet LJ-35A shot down June 7, and 2 Canberra navigators)
14 Ground crew
Aircraft losses
Aircraft lost in the air in combat
Argentine strike aircraft did not carry air-to-air missiles, with the exception of 8th Air Brigade Mirage IIIEA fighters and 6th Air Brigade Daggers on May 1. All retained a secondary armament of either 20 mm or 30 mm cannon.
^"the Mach 2 Mirage and Dagger which in low-level attack are extremely subsonic. ..while low-level attacks by the Argentine aircraft..there would not be a lot of fuel to spare, especially if afterburner was used." From Aviation Fact File - Harrier (1984), page 42.
^"The Argentine-built Pucará counter-insurgency aircraft proved its worth in numerous attacks on British land forces, and it was even used to attack shipping. About 75 Pucarás were in service at the start of the conflict." From Sea Combat off the Falklands (1982), page 33; by Antony Preston; Willow Books,
ISBN978-0-00-218046-7.
^"The British were awed by the courage of the Argentine pilots, flying suicidally low to attack, then vanishing amid flashes of pursuing Sea Cat, Blowpipe, Rapier, racing across the sky behind them. Alone among the enemy's three services, the air force seemed highly motivated and utterly committed to the battle. 'We should have been able to work out that any nation which produces first-class Formula One racing drivers is also likely to turn out some pretty good pilots.'" - Chapter 12; Hastings, Max: The Battle for the Falklands (1983) Michael Joseph Ltd
ISBN0-7181-2228-3
^According to Aeroespacio, Issue 520: "hacia el 15 Abr se producía la recepción de los misiles Matra 550 Magic adquiridos tiempo antes" ("towards April 15th the Matra 550 Magic missiles bought time ago were received")
^"In late afternoon Pucaras attacked the British forces, two dropping napalm tanks which only just missed forward troops. Two Pucaras were shot down during the battle, along with an Aeromacchi [sic]". - Chapter 21 The Bridgehead and Beyond, the battle for Darwin and Goose Green -
Lawrence Freedman, Signals of War, The Falklands Conflict of 1982, 1990, Faber and Faber-London,
ISBN0-571-14116-1
^According to Globalsecurity.org (DWF):"As a result of these heavy losses...it was decided to pull the Mirage III's back to the mainland to stand alert for a possible Vulcan attack."
^According to Globalsecurity.org (HJA):"Finally, the bombing raids caused the Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense."
^As per article "La familia Mirage" in Aeroespacio (Issue 520): "Los M III debían defender el territorio continental argentino de posibles ataques de los bombarderos Vulcan de la RAF, brindar escolta a los cazabombarderos de la FAA, e impedir los ataques de aviones de la Royal Navy y de la RAF sobre las Malvinas." ("The M III would defend the Argentine mainland against possible attacks by Vulcan bombers from the RAF, providing escort of fighter bombers to the FAA, and to prevent attacks by aircraft of the Royal Navy and RAF on the Falklands.")
^SN: C-403, May21, Sea Harrier ZA190/"009", pilot Capt. Donadille ejected, C-404, May21, Sea Harrier ZA190/"009", pilot Maj. Piuma ejected, C-407, May21, Sea Harrier ZA175/"004", pilot Lt. Senn ejected, C-409, May21, Sea Harrier XZ455/"12", pilot Lt. Luna ejected, C-410, May24, Sea Harrier ZA193/"93", pilot Lt. Castillo killed, C-419, May24, Sea Harrier XZ457/"14". pilot Maj. Puga ejected, C-430, May24, Sea Harrier XZ457/"14". pilot Capt. Diaz ejected, C-433, May1, Sea Harrier XZ455/"12". pilot Lt. Ardiles killed, C-437, May23, Sea Harrier ZA194. pilot Lt. Volponi killed
^SN: 3-A-307, 3-A-312 and 3-A-314. One was damaged by
30 mm cannon fire, attempted to land at
Port Stanley but the undercarriage was inoperative and the pilot elected to eject.
"Para colmo, Galtieri dijo en un discurso: „Que saquen el ejemplo de lo que estamos haciendo ahora porque después les toca a ellos“".
^Lt. Col. Hezsely, Csaba (May 1988),
"Argentine Air Power in the Falklands War"(PDF), Air War College, Research Report: 39, AD-A202 551,
archived(PDF) from the original on March 4, 2016 Lt. Col. Hezsely's report notes 16 F-86F deployed at Mendoza
^"Two A-4B Skyhawks warplanes of the Grupo 5 link up...after topping up their tanks from a KC-130H tanker." page 62 in Air War in the Falklands 1982, 2001
^"La familia Mirage". Archived from
the original on 2011-05-31. Retrieved 2008-06-13. La familia Mirage, Aeroespacio, Fuerza Aerea Argentina, ISSN 0001-9127
"British Wye, carrying fuel for the Task Force, came under attack by a modified C-130 Hercules...eight bombs were released, one of which struck the tanker without exploding.
Shields, J.: Air Power in the Falklands Conflict - An Operational Level Insight into Air Warfare in the South Atlantic, 2021, Pen & Sword, Great Britain,
ISBN9781399007528