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Typhoon Cobra
Eye structure captured on radar
Meteorological history
FormedDecember 14, 1944
DissipatedDecember 19, 1944
Category 5-equivalent tropical cyclone
1-minute sustained ( SSHWS/ JTWC)
Highest winds260 km/h (160 mph)
Lowest pressure924 hPa ( mbar); 27.29  inHg
Overall effects
Fatalities790 U.S., unknown elsewhere
Areas affected Philippine Sea
[1] [2]

Part of the 1944 Pacific typhoon season

Typhoon Cobra, also known as the Typhoon of 1944 or Halsey's Typhoon (named after Admiral William Halsey Jr.), was the United States Navy designation for a powerful tropical cyclone that struck the United States Pacific Fleet in December 1944, during World War II. The storm sank three destroyers, killed 790 sailors, damaged 9 other warships, and swept dozens of aircraft overboard off their aircraft carriers.

Task Force 38 (TF 38) had been operating about 300  mi (260  nmi; 480  km) east of Luzon in the Philippine Sea, conducting air raids against Japanese airfields in the Philippines and had been trying to refuel their ships. Information given to Halsey about the typhoon was incorrect, and despite warning signs of worsening conditions, the ships remained on station until December 17 when Halsey ordered the Third Fleet into the center of the typhoon.

With currently available data, [3] it was the 23rd and last known Western Pacific tropical cyclone formed during the 1944 season.

Meteorological history

Map plotting the storm's track and intensity, according to the Saffir–Simpson scale
Map key
  Tropical depression (≤38 mph, ≤62 km/h)
  Tropical storm (39–73 mph, 63–118 km/h)
  Category 1 (74–95 mph, 119–153 km/h)
  Category 2 (96–110 mph, 154–177 km/h)
  Category 3 (111–129 mph, 178–208 km/h)
  Category 4 (130–156 mph, 209–251 km/h)
  Category 5 (≥157 mph, ≥252 km/h)
  Unknown
Storm type
triangle Extratropical cyclone, remnant low, tropical disturbance, or monsoon depression

On December 17, 1944, the typhoon was first observed when United States Third Fleet was refueling. [4] [5] U.S. Army Air Force forecast center on Saipan sent a reconnaissance flight and found the storm heading towards the fleet, with the estimated winds of 140 kn (160 mph; 72 m/s; 260 km/h). [4] [5] As it was headed towards the fleet, barometric pressures as low as 27.3  inHg (924  mbar) were reported by USS Dewey. [2] The storm dissipated on December 19.

Damage to Task Force 38

TF 38 consisted of 7 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers, 8 battleships, 15 cruisers, and about 50 destroyers. The carriers had been conducting raids against Japanese airfields in the Philippines, and ships were being refueled, especially many destroyers, which were running low on fuel. When the storm hit, the procedure had to be aborted.

Damage to the fleet was severe. Some ships rolled more than 70 degrees. Three destroyers, Spence, Hickox, and Maddox, had nearly empty fuel stores (10–15% of capacity) and so lacked the stabilizing effect of the extra weight, making them relatively unstable. Additionally, several other destroyers, including Hull and Monaghan, were of the older Farragut-class and had been refitted with over 500 long tons (510 t) of extra equipment and armament, which made them top-heavy.

Spence, Hull, and Monaghan either capsized or were sunk after water flooded down their smokestacks and disabled their engines. Without power, they were unable to control their heading and were at the mercy of the wind and seas. Hickox and Maddox pumped seawater into their empty fuel tanks, adding enough stability to ride out the storm with relatively minor damage.

Many other ships of TF 38 suffered various degrees of damage, especially to radar and radio equipment, which crippled communications within the fleet. Several carriers suffered fires in their hangars, and 146 aircraft were wrecked or blown overboard. Nine ships—including one light cruiser, three light carriers, and two escort carriers—suffered enough damage to be sent for repairs.

The carrier Monterey was nearly taken down in flames by its own airplanes as they crashed into bulkheads and exploded during violent rolls. One of those fighting the fires aboard Monterey was Lieutenant Gerald Ford, later President of the United States. Ford later recalled nearly going overboard when 20° and greater rolling caused aircraft below decks to career into each other, igniting a fire. Ford, serving as General Quarters Officer of the Deck, was ordered to go below to assess the raging fire. He did so safely and reported his findings back to the ship's commanding officer, Captain Stuart Ingersoll. The ship's crew was able to contain the fire, and the ship got underway again. [6]

Planes went adrift, collided, and burst into flames. Monterey caught fire at 0911 (18 December) and lost steerageway a few minutes later. The fire was brought under control at 0945 and the C.O., Captain Stuart H. Ingersoll, decided to let his ship lie dead in the water until temporary repairs could be effected. She lost 18 aircraft burned in the hangar deck or blown overboard and 16 seriously damaged, together with three 20-mm guns, and suffered extensive rupturing of her ventilation system. Cowpens lost 7 planes overboard and caught fire from one that broke loose at 1051, but the fire was brought under control promptly; Langley rolled through 70 degrees; San Jacinto reported a fighter plane adrift on the hangar deck which wrecked seven other aircraft. She also suffered damage from salt water that entered through punctures in the ventilating ducts. Captain [Jasper T.] Acuff's replenishment escort carriers did pretty well. Flames broke out on the flight deck of Cape Esperance at 1228 but were overcome; Kwajalein made a maximum roll of 39 degrees to port when hove-to with wind abeam. Her port catwalks scooped up green water, but she lost only three planes which were jettisoned from the flight deck; it took one hour to get them over the side. Three other escort carriers lost in all 86 aircraft but came through without much material damage." [7]

In the words of Admiral Chester Nimitz, the typhoon's impact "...represented a more crippling blow to the Third Fleet than it might be expected to suffer in anything less than a major action." The events surrounding Typhoon Cobra were similar to those the Japanese navy faced some nine years earlier in what they termed the " Fourth Fleet Incident".

Ships damaged

USS Cowpens during Typhoon Cobra, 18 December 1944.
USS Langley (CVL-27) rolling heavily during Typhoon Cobra, 18 December 1944.

Rescue efforts

The fleet was scattered by the storm. One ship, the destroyer escort Tabberer, encountered and rescued a survivor from the Hull in the midst of the typhoon. This was the first survivor from any of the capsized destroyers to be picked up. Shortly thereafter, many more survivors were picked up, in groups or in isolation. Tabberer's skipper, Lieutenant Commander Henry Lee Plage, directed that the ship, despite its own dire condition, begin boxed searches to look for more survivors. Tabberer rescued 55 survivors in a 51-hour search, despite repeated orders from Halsey to return all ships to port in Ulithi. She picked up 41 men from Hull and 14 from Spence before finally returning to Ulithi after being directly relieved from the search by two destroyer escorts.

After the fleet had regrouped (without Tabberer), ships and aircraft conducted search-and-rescue missions. The destroyer Brown rescued the only survivors from Monaghan, six in total. She additionally rescued 13 sailors from Hull. Eighteen other survivors from Hull and Spence were rescued over the three days following Typhoon Cobra by other ships of the 3rd Fleet. The destroyer USS The Sullivans (DD-537) emerged from the storm undamaged and began looking for survivors before returning to Ulithi on Christmas Eve. [12] In all, 93 men were rescued of the over 800 men presumed missing in the three ships, and two others who had been swept overboard from the escort carrier Anzio.

Despite disobeying fleet orders, Plage was awarded the Legion of Merit by Halsey, and Tabberer's crew was awarded Navy Unit Commendation ribbons (the first ever awarded).

Aftermath

While conducting refueling operations off the Philippines, the Third Fleet remained on station rather than breaking up and seeking shelter from the storm. This led to a severe loss of men, ships, and aircraft. A Court of Inquiry was convened on board the USS Cascade at the naval base at Ulithi, with Admiral Nimitz, CINCPAC, in attendance at the court. [13] Captain Herbert K. Gates was the judge advocate for the court. [14] The court found that though Halsey had committed an "error of judgement" in sailing the Third Fleet into the heart of the typhoon, it stopped short of unambiguously recommending sanction. In January 1945, Halsey passed command of the Third Fleet to Admiral Raymond A. Spruance.

This typhoon led to the establishment of weather infrastructure of the U.S. Navy, which eventually became the Joint Typhoon Warning Center. [15] [16]

An oiler struggles to maintain position, 17 December 1944

The typhoon plays a central part in Herman Wouk's The Caine Mutiny.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ US Dept of Commerce map (1944)
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w Baldwin (1955)
  3. ^ "IBTrACS - International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship". www.atms.unca.edu.
  4. ^ a b Bryson, Reid A. (2000). "Typhoon Forecasting, 1944, or, The Making of a Cynic". Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society. 81 (10): 2393–2397. Bibcode: 2000BAMS...81.2393B. doi: 10.1175/1520-0477-81.10.2393.
  5. ^ a b Adamson, Hans Christian; Kosco, George F. (1967). Halsey's Typhoons. New York: Crown Publishers. p. 206.
  6. ^ Naval Historical Foundation (2013)
  7. ^ Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II Volume XIII: The Liberation of the Philippines—Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1959, 1989, Library of Congress card number 47-1571, pages 70–71.
  8. ^ Drury, Robert; Clavin, Tom (December 28, 2006). "How Lieutenant Ford Saved His Ship". The New York Times. Retrieved February 3, 2020.
  9. ^ a b c d e f Cressman (2000), p. 282
  10. ^ Pawlowski (1971) p.233
  11. ^ Brown (1990) p.134
  12. ^ USS The Sullivans (DD-537)
  13. ^ Melton Jr. (2007)
  14. ^ Drury (2007)
  15. ^ Affairs, This story was written by Lt Christopher Machado, Joint Typhoon Warning Center Public. "Joint Typhoon Warning Center: Keeping the Fleet Safe". www.navy.mil. Retrieved 2019-09-05.{{ cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( link)
  16. ^ "art00388_JTWC-60anniv". www.public.navy.mil. Archived from the original on 2019-09-05. Retrieved 2019-09-05.

References

External links