The Peshmerga (
Kurdish: پێشمەرگهPêşmerge,
transl. 'Those Who Face Death')[25] comprise the standing military of
Kurdistan Region, an autonomous political entity within the
Republic of Iraq. According to the
Constitution of Iraq, the Peshmerga and their security subsidiaries are solely responsible for the security of Kurdistan Region, chiefly due to the fact that the
Iraqi Armed Forces are forbidden to enter
Iraqi Kurdistan.[26][27][28][29][30][31][32] These subsidiaries include
Asayish (intelligence agency/security forces), Parastin û Zanyarî (assisting intelligence agency), and
Zêrevanî (the gendarmerie). The Peshmerga's history dates back to the 18th century, when they began as a strictly tribal pseudo-military border guard under the
Ottoman Turks and the
Safavid Iranians. By the 19th century, they had evolved into a disciplined and well-trained guerrilla force.[33]
Formally, the Peshmerga are under the command of the
Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs of the
Kurdistan Regional Government. In practice, however, the Peshmerga's structure is largely divided and controlled separately by the two Iraqi Kurdish political parties: the
Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Though unifying and integrating the Peshmerga has been on the Kurdistan Region's public agenda since 1992, the individual forces remain divided due to factionalism, which has proved to be a major stumbling block.[34]
The word "Peshmerga" can be translated to "to stand in front of death",[40][41][42] and Valentine states it was first used by
Qazi Muhammad in the short-lived
Mahabad Republic (1946–47).[43] The word is understandable to
Persian speakers.[44]
The Kurdish warrior tradition of rebellion has existed for thousands of years along with aspirations for independence, and early Kurdish warriors fought against the various Persian empires, the
Ottoman Empire and the
British Empire.[33][45]
Historically the Peshmerga existed only as guerrilla organizations, but under the self-declared
Republic of Mahabad (1946–1947), the Peshmerga led by
Mustafa Barzani became the official army of the republic.[46][47] After the fall of the republic and the execution of head of state
Qazi Muhammad, Peshmerga forces reemerged as guerrilla organizations that would go on to fight the
Iranian and
Iraqi governments for the remainder of the century.[48]
In Iraq, most of these Peshmerga were led by
Mustafa Barzani of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party.[47] In 1975 the Peshmerga were defeated in the
Second Iraqi–Kurdish War.
Jalal Talabani, a leading member of the KDP, left the same year to revitalize the resistance and founded the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. This event created the baseline for the political discontent between the KDP and PUK that to this day divides Peshmerga forces and much of Kurdish society in Kurdistan.[49][50]
After Mustafa Barzani's death in 1979, his son
Masoud Barzani took his position.[47] As tension increased between KDP and PUK, most Peshmerga fought to keep a region under their own party's control while also fighting off Iraqi Army incursions. Following the
First Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Kurdistan saw the
Kurdish Civil War between the two major parties, the KDP and the PUK, and Peshmerga forces were used to fight each other.[51] The civil war officially ended in September 1998 when Barzani and Talabani signed the Washington Agreement establishing a formal peace treaty.[52] In the agreement, the parties agreed to share revenue and power, deny the use of northern Iraq to the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and not allow Iraqi troops into the Kurdish regions. By then, around 5,000 had been killed on both sides, and many more had been evicted for being on the wrong side.[53] In the years after, tension remained high, but both parties moved towards each other, and in 2003 they both took part in the
overthrowing of the Baathist regime as part of the
Iraq War. Unlike other militia forces, the Peshmerga were never prohibited by Iraqi law.[54]
The Peshmerga are mostly divided among forces loyal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and those loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),[56] while other, minor Kurdish parties such as the
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party also have their own small Peshmerga units.[57] The KDP and PUK do not disclose information about the composition of their forces with government or media.[56] Thus there is no reliable number of how many Peshmerga fighters exist.[56] Media outlets have speculated that there are between 150,000 and 200,000 Peshmerga, but this number is highly disputed.[58][59] Peshmerga have divided Kurdistan Region into a KDP-governed "yellow" zone covering
Dohuk Governorate and
Erbil Governorate and a PUK-governed "green" zone covering
Sulaymaniyah Governorate and
Halabja Governorate.[60][56][34] Each zone has its own branch of Peshmerga with their own governing institutions that do not coordinate with the other branch.[34][61]
As a result of the split nature of the Peshmerga forces, there is no central command center in charge of the entire force, and Peshmerga units instead follow separate military hierarchies depending on political allegiance.[62] Multiple unification and depoliticizing efforts of the Peshmerga have been made since 1992. But so far all deadlines have been missed,[34] reforms have been watered down,[56] and most of the Peshmerga are still under the influence of the KDP and the PUK, who also maintain their separate Peshmerga forces. Following the events of the
Iraqi Civil War in 2014, the
United States and several
Europe nations pressured the PUK and KDP to set up mixed brigades of Peshmerga as a condition for aid and funding. The PUK and KDP united 12 to 14 brigades under the Regional Guard Brigades, which were then placed under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.[56] However, officers continue to report to and take orders from their party leaders who also control the deployment of forces loyal to them and appoint front-line and sector commanders[34]
Both the KDP and the PUK rely heavily on
irregulars in times of conflict to increase their ranks.[63] However, both maintain several
professional military brigades. The following units have been identified within the Peshmerga force:
Due to limited funding and the vast size of the Peshmerga forces, the KRG has long planned to downsize its forces from large numbers of low-quality forces to a smaller but much more effective and well-trained force.[72] Consequently, in 2009, the KRG and Baghdad engaged in discussions about incorporating parts of the Peshmerga forces into the Iraqi Army in what would be the 15th and 16th
Iraqi Army divisions.[73][74] However, after increasing tension between Erbil and Baghdad regarding the disputed areas, the transfer was largely put on hold. Some Peshmerga were already transferred but reportedly deserted again, and there are allegations that former Peshmerga forces remained loyal to the KRG rather than their Iraqi chain of command; regardless, thousands of members of the 80 Unit of KDP and the 70 Unit of PUK are based in Baghdad, and they have good cooperation with other Iraqi forces in Baghdad.[75][76][77]
The Peshmerga forces are secular with a Muslim majority and
Assyrian and
Yazidi units.[78][79]
Peshmerga forces largely rely on old arms captured from battles. The Peshmerga captured stockpiles of weapons during the
1991 Iraqi uprisings.[80] Several stockpiles of weapons were captured from the old Iraqi Army during the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq, in which Peshmerga forces were active. Following the retreat of the new Iraqi Army during the June 2014 Islamic State offensive, Peshmerga forces reportedly again managed to get hold of weapons left behind by the Army.[81] Since August 2014, Peshmerga forces have also captured weapons from the Islamic State.[82] In 2015, for the first time, Peshmerga soldiers received urban warfare and military intelligence training from foreign trainers, the
Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.[83]
The Peshmerga arsenal is limited and confined by restrictions because the Kurdish Region has to purchase arms through the Iraqi government. Due to disputes between the KRG and the Iraqi government, arms flows from Baghdad to Kurdistan Region have been almost nonexistent, as Baghdad fears Kurdish aspirations for independence.[84][85][56] After the Islamic State offensive of August 2014, multiple governments armed the Peshmerga with some light equipment such as light arms, night goggles, and ammunition.[86][87] However, Kurdish officials and Peshmerga stressed that they were not receiving enough. They also stress that Baghdad was blocking all arms from reaching the KRG, emphasizing the need for weapons to be sent directly to the KRG and not through Baghdad.[88][89] Despite this, the United States has maintained that the government of Iraq is responsible for the security of Iraqi Kurdistan and that Baghdad must approve all military aid.[56]
The Peshmerga lack a proper medical corps and communication units.[56] This became apparent during the
Islamic State offensive in 2014 where the Peshmerga found itself lacking ambulances and frontline field hospitals, forcing wounded fighters to walk back to safety.[56] There is also a lack of communication tools, as Peshmerga commanders are forced to use civilian cellphones to communicate with each other.[56] Under the guidance of the
US-led coalition the Peshmerga has started to standardize its weapons systems, replacing Soviet-era weapons with
NATO firearms.[56]
The Peshmerga forces are plagued by frequent allegations of corruption, partisanship, nepotism, and fraud.[119][120][121][122] A common result of corruption in the Peshmerga are "ghost employees" which are employees on paper who either do not exist or do not show up for work but receive a salary. Those setting up such a scam split the salary of these employees.[56]
In addition the KDP and PUK have used the Peshmerga to exert or attempt to exert a monopoly on the use of force within their zones.[56] In 2011 KDP Peshmerga fired on anti-government protesters in Sulaymaniyah, and the PUK later used its own security forces to break up these protests,[34] leading to criticism from all of the opposition parties in the parliament. In 2014 the KDP used its Peshmerga to stop ministers from the
Gorran Movement to enter Erbil and attend parliament.[56]
Outside of
Kurdistan Region the Peshmerga has been criticized for using force to exert control of local
Arab,
Yazidi and
Assyrian communities, particularly after taking control of areas officially outside of Kurdistan Region during the
Iraqi Civil War.[123]
Women have played a significant role in the Peshmerga since its foundation. The Kurdish
Zand tribe was known for allowing women in military roles.[33] During the
Iraqi–Kurdish conflict the majority of women served within the Peshmerga in supporting roles such as building camps, taking care of the wounded, and carrying munitions and messages.[63] Several women brigades served on the front lines.
Margaret George Malik[124] was an iconic[125]Assyrian guerilla fighter who was given a leading position in important battles such as the
battle of Zawita Valley.[126] The PUK started recruiting women during the
Kurdish Civil War. Women were given a 45-day basic training that included parade drills and basic marksmanship with various rifles, mortars, and RPGs.[33]
The modern Peshmerga is almost entirely made up of men, while having at least 600
women in their ranks.[132] In the KDP, these Peshmerga women have been refused access to the frontline and are mostly used in logistics and management positions,[133] but PUK Peshmerga women are deployed in the front lines and are actively engaged in combat.[134][135][33]
^
abcdefghijklmnopqrHelfont, Samuel (March 1, 2017). "Getting Peshmerga Reform Right: Helping the Iraqi Kurds to Help Themselves in Post-ISIS Iraq". Foreign Policy Research Institute. 16: 13.
Simon Ross Valentine, Peshmerga: Those Who Face Death: The Kurdish Army, its History, Development, and the Fight against ISIS, Kindle Direct Publishing, 2018, 300pp. [ISBN missing]
Chapman, Dennis P., Lieutenant Colonel USA, Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Mohammed Najat, Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2011.
ISSN0026-3141 Reviewed by Michael M. Gunter in Middle East Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3, Summer 2011.