Huáqiáo (
simplified Chinese: 华侨;
traditional Chinese: 華僑) or Hoan-kheh (
Chinese: 番客;
Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Hoan-kheh) in
Hokkien, refers to people of Chinese citizenship residing outside of either the
PRC or
ROC (Taiwan). The government of China realized that the overseas Chinese could be an asset, a source of foreign investment and a bridge to overseas knowledge; thus, it began to recognize the use of the term Huaqiao.[32]
Ching-Sue Kuik renders huáqiáo in English as "the Chinese
sojourner" and writes that the term is "used to disseminate, reinforce, and perpetuate a monolithic and essentialist Chinese identity" by both the PRC and the ROC.[33]
Huáyì (
simplified Chinese: 华裔;
traditional Chinese: 華裔;
Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Hôa-è) refers to people of Chinese origin residing outside of China, regardless of citizenship.[35] Another often-used term is 海外華人 (Hǎiwài Huárén) or simply 華人/华人 (Huárén) in
Mandarin. It is often used by the
Government of the People's Republic of China to refer to people of Chinese ethnicities who live outside the PRC, regardless of citizenship (they can become citizens of the country outside China by naturalization).
Overseas Chinese who are ethnic
Han Chinese, such as
Cantonese,
Hokchew,
Hokkien,
Hakka or
Teochew refer to themselves as 唐人 (Tángrén), pronounced Tòhng yàn in
Cantonese, Toung ning in
Hokchew, Tn̂g-lâng in
Hokkien and Tong nyin in
Hakka. Literally, it means Tang people, a reference to
Tang dynasty China when it was ruling. This term is commonly used by the
Cantonese,
Hokchew,
Hakka and
Hokkien as a colloquial reference to the Chinese people and has little relevance to the ancient dynasty. For example, in the early 1850s when Chinese shops opened on Sacramento St. in
San Francisco,
California,
United States, the Chinese emigrants, mainly from the
Pearl River Delta west of
Canton, called it Tang People Street (
Chinese: 唐人街;
pinyin: Tángrén Jiē)[36][37]: 13 and the settlement became known as Tang People Town (
Chinese: 唐人埠;
pinyin: Tángrén Bù) or Chinatown, which in Cantonese is Tong Yun Fow.[37]: 9–40
The term shǎoshù mínzú (
simplified Chinese: 少数民族;
traditional Chinese: 少數民族) is added to the various terms for the overseas Chinese to indicate those who would be considered
ethnic minorities in China. The terms shǎoshù mínzú huáqiáo huárén and shǎoshù mínzú hǎiwài qiáobāo (
simplified Chinese: 少数民族海外侨胞;
traditional Chinese: 少數民族海外僑胞) are all in usage. The
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the PRC does not distinguish between Han and ethnic minority populations for official policy purposes.[34] For example, members of the
Tibetan people may travel to China on passes granted to certain people of Chinese descent.[38] Various estimates of the Chinese emigrant minority population include 3.1 million (1993),[39] 3.4 million (2004),[40] 5.7 million (2001, 2010),[41][42] or approximately one tenth of all Chinese emigrants (2006, 2011).[43][44] Cross-border ethnic groups (跨境民族, kuàjìng mínzú) are not considered Chinese emigrant minorities unless they left China after the establishment of an independent state on China's border.[34]
Some ethnic groups who have historic connections with China, such as the
Hmong, may not or may identify themselves as Chinese.[45]
The Chinese people have a long history of migrating overseas, as far back as the 10th century. One of the migrations dates back to the
Ming dynasty when
Zheng He (1371–1435) became the envoy of Ming. He sent people – many of them
Cantonese and
Hokkien – to
explore and trade in the
South China Sea and in the
Indian Ocean.
Early emigration
Different waves of immigration led to subgroups among overseas Chinese such as the new and old immigrants in Southeast Asia,
North America, Oceania, the Caribbean, South America, South Africa, and Europe. In the 19th century, the age of
colonialism was at its height and the great Chinese diaspora began. Many colonies lacked a large pool of laborers. Meanwhile, in the provinces of
Fujian and
Guangdong in China, there was a surge in emigration as a result of the poverty and village ruin.[46] The Qing ruler was forced to allow its subjects to work overseas under colonial powers. Many Hokkien chose to work in Southeast Asia (where they had earlier links starting from the Imperial Chinese era), as did the Cantonese. The area of
Taishan, Guangdong Province was the source for many of the economic migrants.[35] San Francisco and California was an early American destination in the mid-1800s because of the California Gold Rush. Many settled in San Francisco forming one of the earliest Chinatowns. For the countries in North America and Australia saw great numbers of Chinese gold diggers finding gold in the
gold mining and
railway construction. Widespread famine in Guangdong impelled many Cantonese to work in these countries to improve the living conditions of their relatives. Some overseas Chinese were sold[by whom?] to
South America during the
Punti–Hakka Clan Wars (1855–1867) in the
Pearl River Delta in Guangdong. After
World War II many people from the
New Territories in
Hong Kong emigrated to the UK (mainly England) and to the
British Raj India to help depopulation.
Memorials dedicated to Overseas Chinese who perished in northern Borneo (present-day
Sabah, Malaysia) during
World War II after being executed by the
Japanese forces.
Research conducted in 2008 by German researchers who wanted to show the correlation between economic development and height, used a small dataset of 159 male labourers from Guangdong who were sent to the Dutch colony of Suriname to illustrate their point. They stated that the Chinese labourers were between 161 to 164 cm in height for males.[47] Their study did not account for factors other than economic conditions and acknowledge the limitations of such a small sample.
Under the
Republicans economic growth froze and many migrated outside the Republic of China, mostly through the coastal regions via the ports of
Fujian,
Guangdong,
Hainan and
Shanghai. These migrations are considered to be among the largest in China's history. Many nationals of the
Republic of China fled and settled down overseas mainly between the years 1911–1949 before the
Nationalist government led by
Kuomintang lost the mainland to Communist revolutionaries and relocated. Most of the nationalist and neutral refugees fled Mainland China to
North America while others fled to
Southeast Asia (
Singapore,
Brunei,
Thailand,
Malaysia,
Indonesia and
Philippines) as well as
Taiwan (Republic of China).[48]
After World War II
Those who fled during 1912–1949 and settled down in
Singapore and
Malaysia and automatically gained citizenship in 1957 and 1963 as these countries gained independence.[49][50]Kuomintang members who settled in Malaysia and Singapore played a major role in the establishment of the
Malaysian Chinese Association and their meeting hall at
Sun Yat Sen Villa. There was evidence that some intended to reclaim mainland China from the CCP by funding the
Kuomintang.[51][52]
During the 1950s and 1960s, the ROC tended to seek the support of overseas Chinese communities through branches of the
Kuomintang based on
Sun Yat-sen's use of
expatriate Chinese communities to raise money for his revolution. During this period, the People's Republic of China tended to view overseas Chinese with suspicion as possible
capitalist infiltrators and tended to value relationships with Southeast Asian nations as more important than gaining support of overseas Chinese, and in the
Bandung declaration explicitly stated[where?] that overseas Chinese owed primary loyalty to their home nation.[dubious –
discuss]
From the mid-20th century onward, emigration has been directed primarily to Western countries such as the United States, Australia, Canada, Brazil, The United Kingdom, New Zealand, Argentina and the nations of Western Europe; as well as to Peru, Panama, and to a lesser extent to Mexico. Many of these emigrants who entered Western countries were themselves overseas Chinese, particularly from the 1950s to the 1980s, a period during which the PRC placed severe restrictions on the movement of its citizens. In 1984, Britain agreed to transfer the sovereignty of
Hong Kong to the PRC; this triggered another wave of migration to the United Kingdom (mainly England), Australia, Canada, US, South America, Europe and other parts of the world. The
1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre further accelerated the migration. The wave calmed after Hong Kong's transfer of
sovereignty in 1997. In addition, many citizens of Hong Kong hold citizenships or have current visas in other countries so if the need arises, they can leave Hong Kong at short notice.[citation needed]
In recent years, the People's Republic of China has built increasingly stronger ties with African nations. In 2014, author
Howard French estimated that over one million Chinese have moved in the past 20 years to Africa.[53]
More recent Chinese presences have developed in Europe, where they number well over 1 million, and in Russia, they number over 200,000, concentrated in the
Russian Far East. Russia's main Pacific port and naval base of
Vladivostok, once closed to foreigners and belonged to China until the late 19th century, as of 2010[update] bristles with Chinese markets, restaurants and trade houses. A growing Chinese community in Germany consists of around 76,000 people as of 2010[update].[54] An estimated 15,000 to 30,000 Chinese live in Austria.[55]
Chinese emigrants are estimated to control US$2 trillion in liquid assets and have considerable amounts of wealth to stimulate economic power in
China.[56][57] The Chinese business community of Southeast Asia, known as the
bamboo network, has a prominent role in the region's private sectors.[58][59]
In Europe, North America and Oceania, occupations are diverse and impossible to generalize; ranging from catering to significant ranks in
medicine,
the arts and
academia.
Overseas Chinese often send
remittances back home to family members to help better them financially and socioeconomically. China ranks second after India of top remittance-receiving countries in 2018 with over US$67 billion sent.[60]
Assimilation
Overseas Chinese communities vary widely as to their degree of
assimilation, their interactions with the surrounding communities (see
Chinatown), and their relationship with China.
Thailand has the largest overseas Chinese community and is also the most successful case of
assimilation, with many claiming
Thai identity. For over 400 years, descendants of Thai Chinese have largely intermarried and/or assimilated with their compatriots. The present royal house of Thailand, the
Chakri dynasty, was founded by King
Rama I who himself was partly of Chinese ancestry. His predecessor, King
Taksin of the
Thonburi Kingdom, was the son of a Chinese immigrant from Guangdong Province and was born with a Chinese name. His mother, Lady Nok-iang (Thai: นกเอี้ยง), was
Thai (and was later awarded the
noble title of Somdet Krom Phra Phithak Thephamat).
In the Philippines, the Chinese, known as the
Sangley, from
Fujian and
Guangdong were already migrating to the islands as early as 9th century, where many have largely intermarried with both
native Filipinos and
Spanish Filipinos (
Tornatrás). Early presence of
Chinatowns in overseas communities start to appear in
Spanish colonial Philippines around 16th century in the form of
Parians in
Manila, where Chinese merchants were allowed to reside and flourish as commercial centers, thus
Binondo, a historical district of Manila, has become the world's oldest Chinatown.[61] Under Spanish colonial policy of
Christianization,
assimilation and
intermarriage, their colonial mixed descendants would eventually form the bulk of the
middle class which would later rise to the
Principalía and
illustrado intelligentsia, which carried over and fueled the elite ruling classes of the
American period and later independent Philippines. Chinese Filipinos play a considerable role in the
economy of the Philippines[62][63][64][65] and descendants of Sangley compose a considerable part of the
Philippine population.[65][66] Ferdinand Marcos, the former president of the Phillipines Ferdinand Marcos was of Chinese descent, as were many others.[67]
Myanmar shares. a long border with China so ethnic minorities of both countries have cross-border settlements. These include the Kachin, Shan, Wa, and Ta’ang. [68]
In
Cambodia, between 1965 and 1993, people with Chinese names were prevented from finding governmental employment, leading to a large number of people changing their names to a local, Cambodian name. Ethnic Chinese were one of the minority groups targetted by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge during the Cambodian genocide.[69]
In Vietnam, all Chinese names can be pronounced by
Sino-Vietnamese readings. For example, the name of the previous
paramount leaderHú Jǐntāo (胡錦濤) would be spelled as "Hồ Cẩm Đào" in Vietnamese. There are also great similarities between Vietnamese and Chinese traditions such as the use Lunar New Year, philosophy such as
Confucianism,
Taoism and ancestor worship; leads to some
Hoa people adopt easily to Vietnamese culture, however many Hoa still prefer to maintain Chinese cultural background. The official census from 2009 accounted the Hoa population at some 823,000 individuals and ranked 6th in terms of its population size. 70% of the Hoa live in cities and towns, mostly in Ho Chi Minh city while the rests live in the southern provinces.[71]
On the other hand, in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Brunei, the ethnic Chinese have maintained a distinct communal identity.
Overseas Chinese have often experienced hostility and
discrimination. In countries with small ethnic Chinese minorities, the
economic disparity can be remarkable. For example, in 1998, ethnic Chinese made up just 1% of the population of the
Philippines and 4% of the population in
Indonesia, but have wide influence in the Philippine and Indonesian private economies.[72] The book World on Fire, describing the Chinese as a "market-
dominant minority", notes that "Chinese market dominance and intense resentment amongst the indigenous majority is characteristic of virtually every country in Southeast Asia except Thailand and Singapore".[73]
This asymmetrical economic position has incited anti-Chinese sentiment among the poorer majorities. Sometimes the anti-Chinese attitudes turn violent, such as the
13 May Incident in Malaysia in 1969 and the
Jakarta riots of May 1998 in Indonesia, in which more than 2,000 people died, mostly rioters burned to death in a shopping mall.[74]
The state of the
Chinese Cambodians during the
Khmer Rouge regime has been described as "the worst disaster ever to befall any ethnic Chinese community in Southeast Asia." At the beginning of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1975, there were 425,000 ethnic Chinese in
Cambodia; by the end of 1979 there were just 200,000.[78]
It is commonly held that a major point of friction is the apparent tendency of overseas Chinese to segregate themselves into a subculture.[79][failed verification] For example, the anti-Chinese
Kuala Lumpur Racial Riots of 13 May 1969 and
Jakarta Riots of May 1998 were believed to have been motivated by these racially biased perceptions.[80] This analysis has been questioned by some historians, notably Dr.
Kua Kia Soong, who has put forward the controversial argument that the 13 May Incident was a pre-meditated attempt by sections of the ruling Malay elite to incite racial hostility in preparation for a coup.[81][82] In 2006, rioters damaged shops owned by Chinese-
Tongans in
Nukuʻalofa.[83] Chinese migrants were evacuated from the riot-torn
Solomon Islands.[84]
Ethnic politics can be found to motivate both sides of the debate. In Malaysia, many "
Bumiputra" ("native sons")
Malays oppose equal or meritocratic treatment towards Chinese and
Indians, fearing they would dominate too many aspects of the country.[85][86] The question of to what extent ethnic Malays, Chinese, or others are "native" to Malaysia is a sensitive political one. It is currently a taboo for Chinese politicians to raise the issue of Bumiputra protections in parliament, as this would be deemed ethnic incitement.[87]
Many of the overseas Chinese emigrants who worked on railways in North America in the 19th century suffered from racial discrimination in Canada and the United States. Although discriminatory laws have been repealed or are no longer enforced today, both countries had at one time introduced statutes that barred Chinese from entering the country, for example the United States
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (repealed 1943) or the Canadian
Chinese Immigration Act, 1923 (repealed 1947). In both the United States and Canada, further acts were required to fully remove immigration restrictions (namely United States' Immigration and Nationality Acts of
1952 and
1965, in addition to Canada's)
In Australia, Chinese were targeted by a system of discriminatory laws known as the '
White Australia Policy' which was enshrined in the
Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. The policy was formally abolished in 1973, and in recent years
Australians of Chinese background have publicly called for an apology from the Australian Federal Government[88] similar to that given to the 'stolen generations' of indigenous people in 2007 by the then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.
In South Korea, the relatively low social and economic statuses of
ethnic Korean-Chinese have played a role in local hostility towards them.[89] Such hatred had been formed since their early settlement years, where many Chinese-Koreans hailing from rural areas were accused of misbehaviour such as
spitting on streets and
littering.[89] More recently, they have also been targets of hate speech for their association with violent crime,[90][91] despite the Korean Justice Ministry recording a lower crime rate for Chinese in the country compared to native South Koreans in 2010.[92]
Both the
People's Republic of China and the
Republic of China (known more commonly as Taiwan) maintain high level relationships with the overseas Chinese populations. Both maintain
cabinet level ministries to deal with overseas Chinese affairs, and many local governments within the PRC have overseas Chinese bureaus.
Citizenship status
The
Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, which does not recognise
dual citizenship, provides for automatic loss of PRC citizenship when a former PRC citizen both settles in another country and acquires foreign citizenship. For children born overseas of a PRC citizen, whether the child receives PRC citizenship at birth depends on whether the PRC parent has settled overseas: "Any person born abroad whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality. But a person whose parents are both Chinese nationals and have both settled abroad, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, and who has acquired foreign nationality at birth shall not have Chinese nationality" (Article 5).[93]
By contrast, the
Nationality Law of the Republic of China, which both permits and recognises dual citizenship, considers such persons to be citizens of the ROC (if their parents have household registration in Taiwan).
With China's growing economic strength, many of the overseas Chinese have begun to migrate back to China, even though many mainland Chinese millionaires are considering emigrating out of the nation for better opportunities.[94]
In the case of
Indonesia and
Burma, political strife and ethnic tensions has caused a significant number of people of Chinese origins to re-emigrate back to China. In other Southeast Asian countries with large Chinese communities, such as Malaysia, the economic rise of People's Republic of China has made the PRC an attractive destination for many Malaysian Chinese to re-emigrate. As the Chinese economy opens up, Malaysian Chinese act as a bridge because many Malaysian Chinese are educated in the United States or Britain but can also understand the Chinese language and culture making it easier for potential entrepreneurial and business to be done between the people among the two countries.[95]
After the
Deng Xiaoping reforms, the attitude of the PRC toward the overseas Chinese changed dramatically. Rather than being seen with suspicion, they were seen as people who could aid PRC development via their skills and
capital. During the 1980s, the PRC actively attempted to court the support of overseas Chinese by among other things, returning properties that had been confiscated after the 1949 revolution. More recently PRC policy has attempted to maintain the support of recently emigrated Chinese, who consist largely of Chinese students seeking undergraduate and graduate education in the West. Many of the Chinese diaspora are now investing in People's Republic of China providing
financial resources, social and
cultural networks, contacts and opportunities.[96][97]
The Chinese government estimates that of the 1,200,000 Chinese people who have gone overseas to study in the thirty years since
China's economic reforms beginning in 1978; three-quarters of those who left have not returned to China.[98]
Beijing is attracting overseas-trained academics back home, in an attempt to internationalise its universities. However, some professors educated to the PhD level in the West have reported feeling "marginalised" when they return to China due in large part to the country's “lack of international academic peer review and
tenure track mechanisms”.[99]
The usage of Chinese by the overseas Chinese has been determined by a large number of factors, including their ancestry, their migrant ancestors'
"regime of origin", assimilation through generational changes, and official policies of their country of residence. The general trend is that more established Chinese populations in the Western world and in many regions of Asia have
Cantonese as either the dominant variety or as a common community vernacular, while
Standard Chinese is much more prevalent among new arrivals, making it increasingly common in many Chinatowns.[100][101]
Country statistics
There are over 50 million overseas Chinese.[102][103][104] Most of them are living in
Southeast Asia where they make up a majority of the population of
Singapore (75%) and significant minority populations in
Malaysia (22.8%),
Thailand (14%) and
Brunei (10%).
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