Nuclear latency or a nuclear threshold state is the condition of a country possessing the technology to quickly build
nuclear weapons, without having actually yet done so.[1] Because such latent capability is not proscribed by the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this is sometimes called the "Japan Option" (as a work-around to the treaty), as
Japan is considered a "paranuclear" state, being a clear case of a country with complete technical prowess to develop a nuclear weapon quickly,[2][3] or as it is sometimes called "being one screwdriver's turn" from the bomb, as Japan is considered to have the materials, expertise and technical capacity to make a nuclear bomb at will.[4][5][6][7][8][9] However, nuclear latency does not presume any particular intentions on the part of a state recognized as being nuclear-latent.[10]
Nuclear hedging
Nuclear latency can be achieved with solely peaceful intentions, but in some cases nuclear latency is achieved in order to be able to create nuclear arms in the future, which is known as "nuclear hedging".[11] While states engaging in nuclear hedging do not directly violate the NPT, they do run the risk of potentially encouraging their neighboring states, particularly those they have had conflicts with, to do the same, spawning a “virtual” arms race to ensure the potential of future nuclear capability.[11] Such a situation could rapidly escalate into an actual arms race, drastically raising tensions in the region and increasing the risk of a potential nuclear exchange.[11]
Determining peacefulness of a nuclear program
In a paper written following the establishment of the
JCPOA, a Counselor of the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, John Carlson, outlined several criteria for use in helping to determine whether a state's nuclear program was run solely with peaceful intentions, or if the state was engaging in nuclear hedging:[11]
Production of nuclear materials significantly beyond what could feasibly be needed in order to maintain a state's current nuclear reactors. This includes both the processes of the
enrichment of uranium and the
reprocessing of
plutonium.[11]
Retaining stores of nuclear materials which can be used in weapons construction beyond the amount that could reasonably be slated for use in civilian purposes, such as
research or
power generation.[11]
Noncompliance or lack of proper cooperation with the
IAEA, or grievous disregard for reasonable safeguards.[11]
Construction of facilities and infrastructure which is more reasonably oriented toward the production of nuclear weapons than for civil purposes, such as reactors that produce extremely large quantities of plutonium.[11]
Production of technologies which are primarily oriented toward the creation of nuclear weapons, such as the explosive lenses required to build an
implosion-type weapon.[11]
Production or development of systems designed to allow for the deliverance of nuclear payloads, such as
long-range ballistic missiles.[11]
A supposedly civilian nuclear energy program having heavy involvement with the state's military, an indication that the state's military is likely seeking to obtain nuclear materials.[11]
Making use of
black market sources in order to obtain nuclear materials, technology used for reprocessing or enrichment, technology used in the production of nuclear arms or delivery systems, or the purchase of nuclear delivery systems outright.[11]
The state being in a location in which it has a history of severe conflicts in its relationships with several neighboring states.[11] This gives the state a reason to desire nuclear arms as a potential deterrence of its neighboring adversaries.[citation needed]
Nuclear-latent powers
There are many countries capable of producing nuclear weapons, or at least enriching uranium or manufacturing plutonium. Among the most notable are
Japan,
Canada,
Germany,
the Netherlands, and
Australia.[12] In addition,
South Africa has successfully developed
its own nuclear weapons, but dismantled them in 1989. Following the collapse of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement some consider
Iran a nuclear threshold state.[13]Taiwan and
South Korea have both been identified as "insecure" nuclear threshold states—states with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons (South Korea had been involved in nuclear energy technology since the end of the
Korean War and possessed an active nuclear weapons program that was terminated in the mid-1970s with its signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty[14] while still engaging in some clandestine nuclear weapons research into the late 1980s[15]) and the security motivations to seriously contemplate such an option—since the publishing of a
Mitre Corporation report in 1977.[16] US intelligence also believes
Taiwan has designed devices suitable for nuclear testing.[17]
The number of states that are technically nuclear-latent has steadily increased as nuclear energy and its requisite technologies have become more available to a variety of states.[10]