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In political science, Issue Yield refers to Issue Yield theory or its derived Issue Yield index.

Issue Yield theory

Issue Yield theory was developed to explain party strategy and voting behavior in democratic elections. [1] [2] The theory focuses on the electoral risks and opportunities that specific policy issues present to political parties or candidates. The risk-opportunity mix of an issue (its "issue yield") gives incentives or disincentives to each party to emphasize that particular issue in their policy platform and election campaigns. Voters embrace these issue priorities and update their party support in line with their own policy preferences. Overall, by bringing together party strategy and voting behavior, Issue Yield theory seeks to account for the development of public policy and its variation among democratic societies.

According to the theory, high-yield issue goals are those that combine three characteristics:

  • the party's existing voters agree (almost unanimously) on the issue goal, thus minimizing risks of internal division;
  • a large share of the general electorate also agrees on the issue goal, thus maximizing opportunities for electoral expansion;
  • the party is considered credible to achieve the goal, both within the party and by the general electorate.

If these conditions are fulfilled, the issue goal presents a win-win situation, allowing electoral expansion outside the party without losing existing voters.

Issue Yield theory was first presented in an article that appeared in the American Political Science Review in 2014; [1] a simpler presentation (also framing the theory vis-à-vis other theoretical frameworks on the topic) was later published as an entry of the Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behaviour and Public Opinion. [2]

Issue Yield index

The three aforementioned characteristics have been combined in a summary Issue Yield index, ranging between +1 (highest possible yield) and -1 (lowest possible yield), that can be calculated with data from any public opinion survey that includes a vote intention (or vote choice) item and at least one item concerning respondents' positions on an issue. [1]

The index is constructed on the basis of three aggregate quantities: i (the share of the sample that supports the issue goal), p (the share of the sample that supports the party) and f (the share of the sample that supports both). These quantities are combined in a nonlinear fashion: [1]

For surveys that include specific measures of party credibility regarding an issue goal, a credibility-weighted measure has been developed [3] that also takes into account cred (the share of issue goal supporters who consider the party credible on the issue goal) and intcred (the share considering the party credible on the issue goal among party supporters that also support the goal) [4]

Empirical applications

The theory has been first applied to strategic choices of political parties, consistently showing that high-yield goals tend to receive significantly higher priority in party platforms [1] [5] [6] and in party campaign communication, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] with Issue Yield-related considerations being more relevant than voters' general issue priorities. [3]

In addition, the theory has been applied to explain individual-level party support, [14] patterns of cabinet formation, [15] social group campaign appeals [16] and political inequality. [17] [18]

The theory also served as a foundation for the Issue Competition Comparative Project (ICCP), a research project that analyzed party competition in general elections of six West European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK) in 2017-18. Results were presented in a special issue [19] of West European Politics (later published as a book [20]), with data publicly released as GESIS Study ZA7499. A later wave covered Spain (2019), Poland (2019), the United States (2020) and Germany (2021), as well as an ICCP item battery included in a general survey run in the Czech Republic (2021).

Software tools

A free Stata add-on ADO file for calculating the Issue Yield index on survey datasets is available from the issueyield project.

References

  1. ^ a b c d e De Sio, Lorenzo; Weber, Till (November 2014). "Issue Yield: A Model of Party Strategy in Multidimensional Space". American Political Science Review. 108 (4): 870–885. doi: 10.1017/S0003055414000379. hdl: 11385/111201. ISSN  0003-0554. S2CID  46625053.
  2. ^ a b De Sio, Lorenzo (2017-09-22), Fisher, Justin; Fieldhouse, Edward; Franklin, Mark N.; Gibson, Rachel (eds.), "The geometry of party competition", The Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behaviorand Public Opinion (1 ed.), Routledge, pp. 394–403, doi: 10.4324/9781315712390-32, ISBN  978-1-315-71239-0, retrieved 2023-07-24
  3. ^ a b De Sio, Lorenzo; Weber, Till (2020-04-15). "Issue yield, campaign communication, and electoral performance: a six-country comparative analysis". West European Politics. 43 (3): 720–745. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1655968. ISSN  0140-2382. S2CID  211425156.
  4. ^ The formula also includes specifications for handling particular cases: when thy issue goal is negatively associated with the party (i.e. ) the correct measure of internal credibility becomes rather than . Analogously, when , is replaced with . See footnote 11 in De Sio and Weber 2020. These specifications are already implemented in the issueyield software tool.
  5. ^ Pinggera, Michael (2021-12-02). "Congruent with whom? Parties' issue emphases and voter preferences in welfare politics". Journal of European Public Policy. 28 (12): 1973–1992. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1815825. ISSN  1350-1763. S2CID  225243870.
  6. ^ De Sio, Lorenzo; Franklin, Mark N.; Weber, Till (2016-12-01). "The risks and opportunities of Europe: How issue yield explains (non-)reactions to the financial crisis". Electoral Studies. 44: 483–491. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2016.06.006. ISSN  0261-3794.
  7. ^ De Sio, Lorenzo; De Angelis, Andrea; Emanuele, Vincenzo (August 2018). "Issue Yield and Party Strategy in Multiparty Competition". Comparative Political Studies. 51 (9): 1208–1238. doi: 10.1177/0010414017730082. hdl: 11385/175321. ISSN  0010-4140. S2CID  158894783.
  8. ^ van Ditmars, Mathilde M.; Maggini, Nicola; van Spanje, Joost (2020-04-15). "Small winners and big losers: strategic party behaviour in the 2017 Dutch general election". West European Politics. 43 (3): 543–564. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1655959. hdl: 1814/64609. ISSN  0140-2382. S2CID  211406074.
  9. ^ Lachat, Romain; Michel, Elie (2020-04-15). "Campaigning in an unprecedented election: issue competition in the French 2017 presidential election". West European Politics. 43 (3): 565–586. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1655960. ISSN  0140-2382. S2CID  211345418.
  10. ^ Vaccari, Cristian; Smets, Kaat; Heath, Oliver (2020-04-15). "The United Kingdom 2017 election: polarisation in a split issue space". West European Politics. 43 (3): 587–609. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1655961. ISSN  0140-2382. S2CID  159237917.
  11. ^ Franzmann, Simon T.; Giebler, Heiko; Poguntke, Thomas (2020-04-15). "It's no longer the economy, stupid! Issue yield at the 2017 German federal election". West European Politics. 43 (3): 610–638. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1655963. hdl: 10419/209752. ISSN  0140-2382.
  12. ^ Plescia, Carolina; Kritzinger, Sylvia; Oberluggauer, Patricia (2020-04-15). "Parties' issue strategies on the drawing board: the 2017 Austrian case". West European Politics. 43 (3): 639–664. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1655965. ISSN  0140-2382.
  13. ^ Emanuele, Vincenzo; Maggini, Nicola; Paparo, Aldo (2020-04-15). "The times they are a-changin': party campaign strategies in the 2018 Italian election". West European Politics. 43 (3): 665–687. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1655966. hdl: 1814/64404. ISSN  0140-2382. S2CID  211317210.
  14. ^ De Sio, Lorenzo; Franklin, Mark N. (November 2012). "Strategic Incentives, Issue Proximity and Party Support in Europe". West European Politics. 35 (6): 1363–1385. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2012.713750. hdl: 11385/53458. ISSN  0140-2382. S2CID  154262662.
  15. ^ Saijo, Harunobu (September 2021). "The effects of electoral anticipation on portfolio allocation". Party Politics. 27 (5): 1044–1054. doi: 10.1177/1354068820914547. ISSN  1354-0688. S2CID  216497198.
  16. ^ Huber, Lena Maria (2022-05-04). "Beyond Policy: The Use of Social Group Appeals in Party Communication". Political Communication. 39 (3): 293–310. doi: 10.1080/10584609.2021.1998264. ISSN  1058-4609.
  17. ^ Weber, Till (September 2020). "Discreet Inequality: How Party Agendas Embrace Privileged Interests". Comparative Political Studies. 53 (10–11): 1767–1797. doi: 10.1177/0010414020912286. ISSN  0010-4140. S2CID  216350174.
  18. ^ Weber, Till (2021), Weßels, Bernhard; Schoen, Harald (eds.), "Themensetzung, Bevölkerungsstruktur und Stimmenpotenziale", Wahlen und Wähler (in German), Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, pp. 163–178, doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-33582-3_9, ISBN  978-3-658-33581-6, S2CID  244345032, retrieved 2023-07-25
  19. ^ De Sio, Lorenzo; Lachat, Romain, eds. (2020-04-15). "Issue competition in Western Europe: an introduction". West European Politics. 43 (3): 509–517. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1655957. ISSN  0140-2382. S2CID  211391779.
  20. ^ De Sio, Lorenzo; Lachat, Romain, eds. (2021). Conflict Mobilisation or Problem-solving? Issue Competition in Western Europe. London: Routledge. ISBN  9780367710866.
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