"Intent to destroy" redirects here. For the film, see
Intent to Destroy.
Genocidal intent is the mens rea (mental element) for the
crime of genocide.[1] "Intent to destroy" is one of the
elements of the crime of
genocide according to the 1948
Genocide Convention. There is an unresolved "intend debate" over whether dolus directus[definition needed] needs to be proven to convict for genocide, or whether a knowledge-based standard should be enough to convict for genocide.[2]
For an act to be classified as genocide, it is essential to demonstrate that the perpetrators had a deliberate and specific aim (dolus specialis) to physically destroy the group based on its real or perceived nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Intention to destroy the group's culture or intending to scatter the group does not suffice.[3]
It is non-controversial that proving dolus directus[definition needed] would meet the Genocide Convention's intent requirement; the weaker standard of dolus indirectus[definition needed] is less clear. Some scholars argue that a knowledge standard would make it easier to obtain convictions. Some of the existing international tribunal cases like Akayesu and Jelisić have rejected the knowledge standard.[15] The acquittal of Jelisić under the more onerous standard was controversial, and one scholar opined that Nazis would have been allowed to go free under the ICTY's ruling.[16] When
Radislav Krstić became the first Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard, the Krstić court explained that its decision did not rule out a knowledge standard under
customary international law.[15]
In 2010, the
Khmer Rouge Tribunal referred to the precedent of the ICTR in discussing the role of genocidal intent.[17]
In the 2004 United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the
War in Darfur, Claus Kress argued that the ICTY and ICTR were incorrect in their view of the genocidal intent of individuals.[18] Hans Vest argued for the interlinked roles of an individual's intent and the individual's expectation of contributing to a collective action.[19] Kjell Anderson discussed ways of separating out the roles of collective policies and their interaction with individual intent.[20] Olaf Jenssen disagreed with the lack of sentencing
Goran Jelisić for genocidal intent, arguing that legal consistency would imply that some of the perpetrators of the
Holocaust would not have been convicted for genocide.[16]
References
^Thomas W. Simon (2016). Genocide, Torture and Terrorism: Ranking International Crimes and Justifying Humanitarian Intervention. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 17.
ISBN978-1-349-56169-8.
^Rodenhäuser, Tilman (2018). Organizing Rebellion: Non-state Armed Groups Under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 284.
^Lattanzi, Flavia (2018). "The Armenian Massacres as the Murder of a Nation?". The Armenian Massacres of 1915–1916 a Hundred Years Later: Open Questions and Tentative Answers in International Law. Springer International Publishing. pp. 27–104 [65–66].
ISBN978-3-319-78169-3.
^Smith, Roger W. (1999). "State Power and Genocidal Intent: On the Uses of Genocide in the Twentieth Century". Studies in Comparative Genocide. Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 3–14.
ISBN978-1-349-27348-5.
^Campbell, Jason J. (2012). On the Nature of Genocidal Intent. Lexington Books.
ISBN978-0-7391-7847-8.
^Kim, Sangkul (2016). A Collective Theory of Genocidal Intent. Springer.
ISBN978-94-6265-123-4.
^Clark, Janine Natalya (2015). "Elucidating the Dolus Specialis: An Analysis of ICTY Jurisprudence on Genocidal Intent". Criminal Law Forum. 26 (3–4): 497–531.
doi:
10.1007/s10609-015-9260-5.
S2CID143072669.
^"Three Responses to 'Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Commit Genocide?'". Journal of Genocide Research. 10 (1): 111–133. 2008.
doi:
10.1080/14623520701850955.
S2CID216136915.
^Aydin, Devrim (2014). "The Interpretation of Genocidal Intent under the Genocide Convention and the Jurisprudence of International Courts". The Journal of Criminal Law. 78 (5): 423–441.
doi:
10.1350/jcla.2014.78.5.943.
S2CID144141503.
^Behrens, Paul (2015). "Between Abstract Event and Individualized Crime: Genocidal Intent in the Case of Croatia". Leiden Journal of International Law. 28 (4): 923–935.
doi:
10.1017/S0922156515000503.
S2CID152124051.
^Dojčinović, Predrag (2016). "The chameleon of mens rea and the shifting guises of culture-specific genocidal intent in international criminal proceedings". Journal of Human Rights. 15 (4): 454–476.
doi:
10.1080/14754835.2015.1127139.
S2CID148074049.
^
abNersessian, David L. (2002). "The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals". Texas International Law Journal. 37: 231.
^
abJensen, Olaf (2013). "Evaluating genocidal intent: the inconsistent perpetrator and the dynamics of killing". Journal of Genocide Research. 15 (1): 1–19.
doi:
10.1080/14623528.2012.759396.
S2CID146191450.
^Kress, Claus (2005). "The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 3 (3): 562–578.
doi:
10.1093/jicj/mqi054.
^Vest, H. (2007). "A Structure-Based Concept of Genocidal Intent". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 5 (4): 781–797.
doi:
10.1093/jicj/mqm036.
^Anderson, Kjell (2019). "Judicial Inference of the 'Intent to Destroy'". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 17 (1): 125–150.
doi:
10.1093/jicj/mqz025.