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Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis | |||||||||
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Part of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (until 2024) | |||||||||
Armenia–Azerbaijan border | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Azerbaijan | Armenia | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Per Azerbaijan: |
Per Armenia: | ||||||||
22+ non-combatants killed ( International Crisis Group) [41] |
The military forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in a border conflict since 12 May 2021, when Azerbaijani soldiers crossed several kilometers into Armenia in the provinces of Syunik and Gegharkunik. Despite international calls for withdrawal from the European Parliament, the United States, and France, Azerbaijan has maintained its presence on Armenian soil, occupying at least 215 square kilometres (83 sq mi) of internationally recognized Armenian territory. [1] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] This occupation follows a pattern of Azerbaijan provoking cross-border fights and instigating ceasefire violations when its government is unhappy with the pace of negotiations with Armenia. [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53]
There have been repeated escalations, with significant incursions occurring along the Armenia–Nakhchivan border in July 2021 and in the Gegharkunik–Kalbajar area in November 2021. [48] In a further provocation, Azerbaijani forces blockaded southern Armenia in August 2021 by closing the main north–south highway, effectively isolating Armenia from Iran and forcing the creation of alternative transportation routes. [54] [55] [56] [57] The most severe confrontation took place in September 2022, marking the largest attack by Azerbaijan on Armenia in the history of their conflict, resulting in casualties on both sides. [58] [59] [60] [61]
Despite Armenia's appeals for assistance from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and Russia during Azerbaijan's incursions in May 2021 and September 2022, both entities declined to assist, leaving Armenia on its own. [62] [63] Officials from the European Parliament, the United States, and Russia have condemned Azerbaijan's military operations as violations of the ceasefire agreement. [64] [65] [48] [50] [66] [67] [68] [49] Azerbaijan's incursions have been combined with threats and territorial claims referring to Armenia as " Western Azerbaijan" made by the president of Azerbaijan: [69] "Armenia must accept our conditions" if Armenians wish to "live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers," (11,000 sq. mi.). [70] [71] [72]
In response to the ongoing aggression, Armenia allocated additional defense areas to border guards of the Russian Federal Security Service. [73] [74] Additionally, the EU dispatched a CSDP civilian monitoring mission to Armenia to promote border stability and deter future Azerbaijani offensives, despite criticism from Azerbaijani and Russian officials. [75] [76] [77] [42] The enduring conflict has heavily militarized the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, drastically affecting the lives of local Armenian residents. Communities have faced direct targeting, with restricted access to essential resources, farmlands, and social infrastructures, leading to a significant displacement of civilians. [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84]
Armenia and Azerbaijan have not officially demarcated their mutual borders since becoming independent states following collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. [85] [86]
The issue of border demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan arose immediately after the defeat of Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Azerbaijan regaining control over its occupied territories. Before the 2020 war, there was no mutually agreed upon border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with certain Armenian villages and agricultural workers crossing over into Azerbaijan. [87] During Soviet times, cross-border interactions and movements were common. [88] [89] [90]
The issue of exclaves/enclaves is another border-related issue; there is an exclave called Artsvashen which is formally part of Soviet-era Armenia but controlled by and situated entirely within the current Republic of Azerbaijan; likewise, there are 4 Azerbaijani exclave villages of Karki, Yukhari Askipara, Barxudarlı and Sofulu that were formally part of Soviet-era Azerbaijan but are controlled by and situated entirely within the current Republic of Armenia. [85] In addition, Armenia controls another 4 villages within the de-jure borders of Azerbaijan: Aşağı Əskipara, Bağanis Ayrum, Qızılhacılı, and Xeyrimli. [91]
Following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, physical demarcation of the borders commenced in certain areas using excavators. [86] Azerbaijan used Armenia's main north–south highway and Google Maps to unofficially demarcate the border between the southern regions of the two countries; [88] [86] [92] Armenian residents who lived on the east side of the highway were given three days to leave. [88] [93] Azerbaijan built many new border posts often using Armenian roads under the escort of Russian military. [88] Intimidated by the presence of Azerbaijani military, certain Armenians living in border regions limited the number of trips to the region using the main highway; others moved away permanently. [88] Armenia and Azerbaijan agree that Soviet-era borders should form the basis of border delineation based on the Alma-Ata 1991 Declaration, [94] [95] although Azerbaijan has rejected the use of late Soviet maps. [96] [97] [98] [99] On 19 April 2024, following the eighth round of talks between Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan and Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan Shahin Mustafayev held at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border the parties agreed to start the delimitation process on the section between Armenia’s Tavush province and Azerbaijan’s Qazax district, and Armenia agreed to return the four border villages within Azerbaijan that it has controlled since the early 1990s as the initial step. This sparked protests among some residents of the neighboring villages of Tavush province. [100] The agreement was welcomed by the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken [101], President of the European Council Charles Michel [102], on behalf of the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, his spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric [103], and other political leaders.
Since the end of the war, Azerbaijan has increasingly promoted expansionist claims to Armenian territory which it describes as "Western Azerbaijan" [104] [105] [106] [107] which have been perceived as a bargaining strategy to force Armenians to relinquish control of Artsakh [108] and concede the " Zangezur corridor." [109] The Azerbaijani government has also successfully petitioned Google to remove historical Armenian place names from maps of Artsakh. [110] [111]
In April 2021, Azerbaijan's president Ilham Aliyev made irredentist claims over Armenia's capital Yerevan, Zangezur (Syunik), and Sevan (Gegharkunik), declaring that they are "historical lands" of Azerbaijan. [112] [113] He said that if Armenia would not agree to provide a corridor from Nakhchivan to western Azerbaijan through Armenia's Syunik Province, then Azerbaijan would establish it through the use of force, claiming that Azerbaijani people would return to what he described as "West Zangazur". [114] [115] [116] [117] Turkey supports Azerbaijan and also seeks territorial control over Armenia's Syunik province. [118]
A joint statement by the European Parliament Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, Marina Kaljurand, and Standing Rapporteurs on Armenia and Azerbaijan, Andrey Kovatchev and Željana Zovko condemned the statements made by the Azerbaijani side: "To de-escalate the situation...we condemn in particular recent statements by Azerbaijani representatives regarding so-called 'West Zangezur' and referring to the territory of the Republic of Armenia as Azerbaijani 'ancestral land'. Such statements are highly irresponsible and threaten to undermine regional security further." [119]
The day of Azerbaijan's first military incursion on 12 May 2021, it announced it was holding a four-day exercise involving 15,000 soldiers, involving tanks, missile systems, and aviation units, among other military resources. [120] [121]
Azerbaijani soldiers are occupying internationally recognized Armenian territory and conducting engineering and fortification works. [3] [122] [44] [45] [123] [124] [4] [125] [126] [127] Estimates of the amount of territory occupied vary between 50 and 215 square kilometers (20 and 83 sq. mi.) with some local Armenian officials and farmers claiming that the Azerbaijani military has made bigger territorial gains than is admitted by officials in Yerevan. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [128] [129]
European PACE monitors have "…observed the presence of Azerbaijani military positions within Armenian sovereign territory sometimes well beyond any disputed border line… [including]… strategic high ground… overlooking the main road linking the capital Yerevan to the Iranian border. [130] These strategic heights are in the regions of Gegharkunik, Kapan, and near the village of Nerkin Khand further south. [8] According to International Crisis Group, these new positions clearly give Azerbaijan an advantage if fighting resumes since they encircle several Armenian villages and overlook the main road to Syunik which is considered "a lifeline for the country's communication's routes" to both Iran and Nagorno-Karabakh. [131] [2]
Locals fear Azerbaijan will threaten to cut off southern Armenia from the rest of the country unless Armenia surrenders concessions such as the Zangezur corridor. [131] Southern Armenia (Syunik) is often referred to as "the backbone of Armenia" given that it connects Armenia both to Artsakh as well as to Iran. [132] With 80% of Armenia's borders being closed since Turkey and Azerbaijan's 30 year-long blockade, [133] the border with Iran comprises one of only two open international borders to Armenia. [132]
Since Azerbaijan's military incursions, Armenia's eastern border has become militarized; it has been common for Armenian farmers in border areas to be shot at and for their livestock to be robbed. [79] [80] Azerbaijani forces kidnap, torture, rape, execute, and "forcibly disappear" Armenian civilians in border regions. [134] [135] [136] Fearing for their safety, many Armenian villagers have stopped using land previously used for agricultural purposes and others have moved away permanently. [82] [88] [80]
Azerbaijan has not withdrawn its troops from internationally recognised Armenian territory despite calls to do so by the European Parliament, United States [137] and France – the latter two which comprise two of three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Azerbaijan argues that it cannot be accused of occupying Armenian lands without official border demarcation. [131] [138] Azerbaijani media outlets and notable politicians within the country have called for the occupation of more Armenian land. [139] [140]
On 12 May, hundreds of Azerbaijani soldiers crossed several kilometres (miles) into Armenian territory and occupied territory within the provinces of Gegharkunik and Syunik. [141] [87] [142] The same day, Azerbaijan announced it was holding a four-day exercise involving 15,000 soldiers, tanks, missile systems, and aviation units. [120] [121]
In Syunik, Azerbaijani soldiers attempted to surround Lake Sev. [44] [87] The soldiers advanced towards civilian settlements, scaring local agricultural workers. [82] Incursions by Azerbaijani soldiers were also observed in Verishen and Sisian within Syunik [143] [144] [145]
In Gegharkunik, Azerbaijani incursions were also observed, including in Vardenis, [146] [141] [143] [144] [145] with certain media outlets reporting that Azerbaijani forces had captured areas there. [147] The Armenian National Security Service warned of the legal consequences of reporting misinformation that "cause[s] panic." [147]
Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan said negotiations were ongoing for an Azerbaijani withdrawal, and that Armenian forces had stopped the advance without any skirmishes having taken place.[ citation needed]
Azerbaijan claims that its forces did not cross into Armenia and merely took up positions that were inaccessible in winter months, adding that the border between the two countries was never formally demarcated following the collapse of the Soviet Union. [148]
However, Soviet maps from 1975 show that over 90% of Sev Lake is in Armenian territory, with only a small section of the northern shore situated within Azerbaijan SSR [44] [149] [150] The map also shows the adjacent smaller Lake Janlich (Jinli) as entirely in Armenian territory. [149] [151] [150] The Azerbaijani side, showed a map with the entire Sev lake belonging to Azerbaijan, and refused to leave the territory. [87] [82]
On 13 May, the Armenian Defense Ministry reported that Azerbaijani forces crossed the Armenian border in two other sections. [145] The same day, Nikol Pashinyan said that 250 Azerbaijani soldiers remained within Armenia's internationally recognized borders. [145]
On 14 May, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, formally appealed to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to hold consultations regarding the Azerbaijani incursion into Armenia. [152] [153] [154] [155] Armenian and Azerbaijani military officials convened at the border together with representatives of the Russian military deployed in the Syunik Province for several hours of negotiations, without any immediate resulting agreement being announced afterwards. [152] Pashinyan also said in a speech on 14 May that French President Emmanuel Macron said that France was ready to provide military assistance if necessary. [121]
On 15 May, Armenia's Defense Ministry stated that the situation regarding the Azerbaijani incursion on 12–13 May remained unresolved, with some Azerbaijani soldiers still on Armenian territory, and that negotiations in order to bring about a peaceful settlement were ongoing. [156]
On 15 May, the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan responded by saying that it was enforcing the borders of Azerbaijan on the basis of "maps available to both sides", criticizing the Armenian statements as "provocative" and "inadequate". The Ministry also accused the Armenian authorities of using the situation for pre-election domestic political purposes, [157] [158] a claim which is considered unlikely. [159]
During a call with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Azerbaijani President Aliyev described Armenia's decision to appeal to the CSTO as an attempt to "internationalize the issue". [160]
On 19 May, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia came up with an initiative to create a joint Armenia-Azerbaijan commission on demarcation and delimitation of the borders, in which Russia could play the role of a consultant or mediator. [161] On 20 May, acting prime minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia and Azerbaijan were close to an agreement on the creation of a joint commission to demarcate the border between the two countries, with Russia acting as a mediator, and each country appointing delegates to the commission by 31 May. [162]
In the morning of 20 May, a group of Azerbaijani servicemen crossed the border near the village of Khoznavar in the Goris region, walking 1.5 km (1 mile) into Armenian territory. They were forced back to their original positions by Armenian forces, but they then made a second attempt to cross the border in the evening, resulting in a fight between Armenian and Azerbaijani servicemen. The General Prosecutor's Office of Armenia reported that eleven Armenian soldiers were injured and hospitalized, and that there were injuries from the Azerbaijani side, too. The videos of the incident were leaked on social media, initially a video of Azerbaijani military men attacking and beating Armenian soldiers, and, on the next day, another video showing the Armenian Armed Forces expelling Azerbaijani servicemen from their territory appeared. [30]
On 25 May, an Armenian soldier was killed 7 kilometers (5 miles) within Armenian territory which Azerbaijan denied. [159] The same day, all male staff working for the administration of the Sisian community were mobilized into volunteer defense units. [159]
On 27 May, after the tensions rose further after the capture of six Armenian soldiers by Azerbaijani forces early in the morning, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called for the deployment of international observers along portions of Armenia's border with Azerbaijan. "If the situation is not resolved this provocation could inevitably lead to a large-scale clash," Pashinyan said at an emergency meeting of Armenia's Security Council held in the evening, suggesting Armenia and Azerbaijan to pull back their troops from the border areas and let Russia and/or the United States and France, the two other co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, deploy their observers there. The disengagement of troops and the launch of the monitoring mission, should be followed by a process of "ascertaining border points" supervised by the international community, the Prime Minister said. [37]
On 28 May, the EU spokesperson Peter Stano called for immediate de-escalation and urged both sides to pull back their forces to positions held before 12 May and engage in negotiations on border delimitation and demarcation, welcoming proposals for a possible international observation mission and expressing readiness to provide expertise and help on border delimitation and demarcation. The EU continues to call on Azerbaijan to release all prisoners of war and detainees without delay and welcomes all efforts aimed at decreasing tensions. [163]
After an incident on 6 July in the Agdam District, Armenian and Azerbaijani forces clashed again in the directions of Azerbaijan's Tovuz, Gadabay, Nakhchivan and Shusha districts from 7 to 20 July. [164] [165] [166] On 14 July, the Armenian defence ministry stated that the Azerbaijani engineers tried to advance their military positions near Yeraskh in the Nakhchivan section of the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, and clashes erupted. The ministry added that the Azerbaijani side had started shelling Yeraskh, using mortars and grenade launchers, with an Armenian soldier getting killed [167] [23] and the community leader of Yeraskh getting wounded. [168] The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry stated that an Azerbaijani soldier stationed near Heydarabad was wounded during the clashes, [18] and added that the "responsibility for the creation of tension along the state border of the two countries lies entirely with Armenia." [169] The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry later on the same day stated that the Armenian forces had fired at the Azerbaijani positions near Istisu in Kalbajar and Aghdam in Tovuz. [170] On 19 July, further clashes erupted near Yeraskh on Armenia's eastern border with Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan. [51] [171]
On 22 July 2021, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made another irredentist claim over Armenia's province of Syunik (also known as Zangezur), saying that it is "our own territory":
While in Yerevan, Charles Michel called the territories bordering with Armenia disputed. To be honest, I disagree with this statement. Because we believe that these are our territories. I believe that this is the territory of Zangezur. And Zangezur is the land of our ancestors, and we are on our territory.
— Ilham Aliev [172]
On 23 July 2021, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence stated that one of its soldiers was killed by Armenian sniper fire in Kalbajar District near the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. [10] Meanwhile, the Armenian MoD stated that three Armenian servicemen were wounded as Azerbaijani forces opened fire on Armenian positions located in the Gegharkunik section. [173]
On 28 July 2021, the Human Rights Defender of Armenia reported about intensive firing from the Azerbaijani side between 03:30 and 03:40 targeting civilian buildings in the villages of Verin Shorzha and Saradeghy in the Gegharkunik Province. [174] On the same day, three Armenian soldiers were killed in renewed clashes with Azerbaijani forces in the Kalbajar District and Gegharkunik Province, with four others wounded. Armenia accused Azerbaijan of "occupying Armenia's sovereign territory" as the Azerbaijani side blamed the incident on Armenian forces, stating that they opened fire first. Azerbaijan also reported 2 soldiers wounded during the skirmish. [19] [24] [32] [33]
On 29 July, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence stated that Armenian forces broke the ceasefire in the morning, using automatic rifles and grenade launchers. [175] Armenian authorities then stated that the Azerbaijani side had violated the ceasefire, [176] but Azerbaijan denied that it broke the ceasefire. [177] An Armenian soldier was wounded in the shootout. [34]
On 31 July, Armenian authorities stated that Azerbaijani forces fired upon a logistic support vehicle delivering food to Armenian military positions in Yeraskh. As a result, the vehicle was "seriously damaged". [178]
On 13 August 2021, Armenia and Azerbaijan reported about shelling on the border. The Armenian MoD stated that the Azerbaijani units opened fire from various calibre firearms at the Armenian positions in the Gegarkunik section, meanwhile Azerbaijan said that the Armenian forces had opened fire in the direction of the Kalbajar and Gadabay Districts. [179]
On 16 August 2021, two further Armenian soldiers were killed by Azerbaijani forces. [25] Vahan Tatosyan died from sniper fire at 09:50hrs in Yeraskh, while Arman Hakobyan was killed in Gegharkunik at 18:10hrs. [180] [181]
On 17 August 2021, Armenian Ministry of Defence reported that another Armenian soldier was wounded as a result of a shelling attack from Azerbaijan. [182]
On 25 August, Azerbaijani forces blockaded southern Armenia (Syunik) by closing the main north–south (Goris – Kapan) highway in Armenia in two sections near the villages of Karmrakar and Shurnukh, interrupting all international transit with Iran. [54] [55] The following day Azerbaijani forces blocked another section of the road further north, near the village of Vorotan. [54] [55] The blockade stranded hundreds of Iranian trucks and resulted in the isolation of three villages located in between the closed sections of the road. [55] The blockade was alleviated partly under the escorts of Russian border guards which patrol the Armenian side of the border. [55] [183] [184] [185]
Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan announced that the issue would be solved with the construction of a new north–south transport corridor, which was completed in November 2021. [54] [186]
On 27 August 2021, the Armenian Human Rights Defender reported that Azerbaijani troops had targeted Kut village: "Elderly people and children were in the yard at the time of the shooting. There were also children in the house at that time. On August 27, at around 10 pm, Azerbaijani armed forces fired intensively at civilian houses in the village of Kut, Gegharkunik region, directly targeting the civilian population," reported Arman Tatoyan. [187] [188]
On 1 September 2021, the Armenian soldier Gegham Sahakyan was killed by Azerbaijani sniper fire in Yeraskh. [26] [189] Following increased tension with Iran, Azerbaijan began charging taxes on Iranian truck drivers who deliver supplies to Armenia through the main north-south highway, which Azerbaijan had previously blockaded. [190]
On 9 October 2021, the Armenian MoD reported that an Armenian serviceman, Misak Khachatryan, was injured by a shot from border with Azerbaijan in Ararat Province. [191]
On 15 October 2021, Azerbaijani MoD reported that an Azerbaijani soldier was killed by Armenian sniper fire. [192]
On 15 and 16 October 2021, Armenian media reported that Azerbaijani forces shelled the village of Yeraskh, causing fires which damaged crops. [193] [194]
Between 12 and 15 November 2021, Azerbaijan extended its blockade of southern Armenia by installing additional border checkpoints on the roads between and leading to the cities of Goris and Kapan. [56]
On 16 November 2021, clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia took place at the Syunik–Gegharkunik/Kalbajar–Lachin regions. At least seven Azerbaijani and 15 Armenian soldiers were killed, [12] [195] with 32 Armenian soldiers captured. [38]
It appeared that Azerbaijan was using force to coerce Armenia into signing an agreement with various objectives: to demarcate their shared border, to establish an extraterritorial corridor through Armenia to Nakhchivan, and for Armenia to reaffirm that Artsakh is part of Azerbaijan. [195] [56] [196] [43] Haqqin, a pro-government Azerbaijani news agency, wrote "Azerbaijan has demonstrated that it is prepared to inflict the final blow against Armenia. For good. After this, Yerevan will have no alternative to return to the negotiating table." [195] Although Azerbaijan claimed that Armenia provoked the fighting, geolocation footage indicated the Azerbaijani forces had made incursions clearly inside Armenia proper. [197]
The clashes ended at 18:30 local time after a Russian-mediated ceasefire. [198] On November 16, Pashinyan said that Azerbaijani forces occupied about 41 square kilometres (16 sq mi) of Armenia. The figure of 41 square kilometers (15 sq. mi.) has been used since May, which would suggest that no new land was occupied in this newest round of fighting, but this contradicted with the Armenian MOD report, according to which Armenia has lost two military positions on 16 November. [199]
On November 17, a joint statement was issued by various EU officials: Marina Kaljurand (the European Union's chair of the delegation for relations with the South Caucasus), Andrey Kovatchev (the European Parliament's standing rapporteur on Armenia), and Željana Zovko (the European Parliament's standing rapporteur on Azerbaijan). These EU officials called the military operation launched by Azerbaijan on 16 November 2021 "the worst violation to date of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement" and "condemn[ed] any attempts at "borderisation", as observed since the incursion of Azerbaijani troops into Armenian territory. [48]
On 22 November 2021, an Armenian soldier was killed by Azerbaijani forces near the village of Norabak in Gegharkunik province. [27]
On December 3, a 65-year-old civilian, Seyran Sargsyan, from the Chartar village of Martuni district was captured and killed by the Azerbaijani military. The Russian peacekeepers have started and investigation on the case involving both sides. [200] [201]
On 4 December, Azerbaijan freed 10 captured Armenian soldiers captured from the 16 November clashes in exchange of maps detailing the location of landmines in Nagorno Karabakh, the agreement was achieved with Russian mediation. [202]
On 9 December, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence announced that an Azerbaijani soldier was killed in a skirmish with Armenian forces on the Azeri-Armenian border. [13]
On 10 December, the Armenian Ministry of Defence announced that an Armenian soldier was killed after clashes with Azerbaijani forces on the Gegharkunik area of the Armenian-Azerbijani border. [28]
On 18 December, two Azerbaijani servicemen were captured by Armenian forces near Lachin, the soldiers were later released. [21]
On 11 January, one Azerbaijani soldier and three Armenian soldiers were killed in a shootout in the Verin Shorzha area of Armenia's Gegharkunik province. [203] [204] [40]
On 6 April, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President İlham Aliyev met in Brussels for peace talks mediated by the European Council President Charles Michel. [205] [206]
On 6 April, the government of Azerbaijan said that Armenian forces shelled Azerbaijani military positions deployed in the Republic of Armenia's north-eastern borderline. However, Armenia's Defense Ministry refuted this. [207]
On the morning of 12 September 2022, Azerbaijan initiated an unprovoked invasion of Armenia, striking positions along a 200 km (100 mile) stretch of their shared border. [208] [209] [210] [211] Azerbaijan offensives hit 23 locations as far as 40 km (25 miles) within Armenia in the Syunik, Gegharkunik, and Vayots Dzor provinces. [212] [213] [214] [215] [216] Azerbaijani forces attacked military and civilian positions in Vardenis, Goris, Sotk, Jermuk, and other cities [217] with artillery, drones, and heavy weapons. [218] [219] [220] [221] At least 105 Armenian soldiers and 71 Azerbaijani military personnel were killed. [222] [223]
Azerbaijan claimed that Armenian forces had staged "large-scale subversive acts" using "saboteurs" who planted landmines, [216] [224] [225] [223] an allegation the government spread during the days following the invasion [226] and also echoed by Azerbaijan's ally Turkey. [226] Various journalists, politicians, and political analysts have scrutinized these allegations and consider them unfounded or unverifiable. [208] [209] [210] [211] [227] [228] [229] Arkady Dubnov, a political scientist and expert on the Southern Caucasus said "This doesn't look convincing, and everyone understands that this was a contrived excuse. No Azeri officials have provided any evidence to substantiate the incursion." [230]
According to Thomas de Waal, political analyst and author of several books on the Caucasus, some media outlets misleadingly described the fighting as "border clashes" and made reference to the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh despite the fact "no fighting took place in Karabakh...or indeed in Azerbaijani territory; it was all inside the territory of Armenia." [231] Around 30 or 40 towns and villages located in sovereign Armenian territory were attacked, resulting in 7,600 people being displaced. [232] According to certain media reports Azerbaijan used large-calibre weapons such as Grad missiles to target civilian settlements. [216] Azerbaijani President Aliyev later directly referred to the invasion in a speech, making irredentist statements about Armenian territory and confirming that Azerbaijan forces now control strategic highground in the area: [233] "As a result of this [September 2022] military operation, our historical cities are now in front of our eyes through visual observation." [234] Following Azerbaijan's attacks, pro-government media outlets and notable politicians within the country called for occupation of more Armenian land, claiming that a "buffer zone" was needed to deter "Armenian provocations.". [139] [140]
On 15 September 2022 at 12:20 a.m., Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan announced that a ceasefire agreement had been reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan; [235] however, Azerbaijan did not confirm the ceasefire in any public statement. [235] [211] The fighting ended with Azerbaijani troops taking control of new positions deep inside Armenia, with at least 7600 civilians displaced from Armenian provinces. [236] [237]
Due to Azerbaijan's September attacks of Armenia, various foreign embassies including those of France, Britain, and the United States, have issued travel advisories against visiting southern Armenia and areas which share a border with Azerbaijan, including the provinces of Syunik, Vayots Dzor, as well as southern Gegharkunik, and parts of Tavush. [238]
On 6 October 2022, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev met at the first European Political Community summit in Prague in an attempt to resolve the long running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the recent Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis. Following the meeting, it was stated that the two parties agreed to the deployment of a European Union led mission, which would be deployed on the Armenian side of their shared border for a period of two months, starting in October 2022. [239] [240] The stated aim of the mission is to "build confidence and, through its reports, to contribute to the border commissions" work towards delimitation of the border between the two parties. On October 12, nearly a month after Azerbaijan's attack, the Security Council of Armenia said there would be a peace deal between the two countries by the end of the year. [241]
The OSCE also sent a Needs Assessment Team to Armenia between 21 and 27 October 2022, following a request made by the government of Armenia. The OSCE sent a group of international experts and representatives of the OSCE Secretariat to assess the situation in certain border areas along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. [242]
On 23 January, the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) launched its operations. The objective of the CSDP mission is to contribute to stability in the border areas of Armenia, build confidence on the ground, conduct active patrolling and reporting, and to support normalization efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan led by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel. [243] EUMA will have an initial mandate of 2 years with the possibility of extension.
A skirmish resulting in 7 people dying occurred near the village of Tegh which is the last village on the Lachin Corridor in Armenia before it enters Azerbaijani territory. [244] [245] Video footage released by the Armenian Ministry of Defence showed Azerbaijani troops firing after approaching Armenian soldiers who were digging trenches along the border. [246] The French Foreign Ministry issued a statement: "Armenia's territorial integrity must be respected and Azerbaijani forces occupying positions on the Armenian side of the line of contact must withdraw in order to prevent future incidents and preserve the foundations of a lasting peace in the region." [247]
On 5 May, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated, "a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is within reach," following the conclusion of four days of extensive negotiations held in Washington, D.C. Blinken confirmed that progress had been made and was hopeful that President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan would likely come up with a framework agreement on the sidelines of the 2nd European Political Community Summit to be held in Moldova in June 2023. [248]
Following the negotiations held in the US, it was announced that Armenia and Azerbaijan would resume peace talks in Brussels. According to officials, Western entities are encouraging mediation efforts between the two sides. President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan are set to meet with European Council president Charles Michel, followed by another meeting with German chancellor Olaf Scholz and French president Emmanuel Macron. [249]
Azerbaijani and Armenian forces exchanged artillery fire on 11 May along the border, near the town of Sotk in the Gegharkunik Province, leaving at least one soldier dead with several others wounded. [250] Both sides traded blame. [251] [252] Tensions escalated after Azerbaijan installed a checkpoint to the Lachin corridor in 2022. [251]
Nikol Pashinyan issued a warning that there is a likely chance of a third war unless both sides can reach a permanent peace. [253]
On 3 September, during an interview, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that it was a strategic mistake for Armenia to solely rely on Russia to guarantee its security. Pashinyan stated, "Moscow has been unable to deliver and is in the process of winding down its role in the wider South Caucasus region" and "the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia's security needs. This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake." Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeepers of failing to uphold the ceasefire deal. Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia is trying to diversify its security arrangements, most notably with the European Union and the United States. [254]
On 7 September, speaking at a meeting of senior government officials, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan accused Azerbaijan of building up an army on the Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian borders. [255] [256]
Four Armenian soldiers were killed and one wounded on 13 February around the village of Nerkin Hand (Syunik), an area from which Azerbaijan previously had seized territory during its September 2022 attacks. [257] Azerbaijan stated it had "completely destroyed" an Armenian defensive position in a staged "a revenge operation" for a "provocation" it said Armenian forces had committed the day before. Armenia denied the allegations. [258] [259] [260] Azerbaijan dubbed its attack "Operation Revenge," a name it has used for several previous operations. [261]
In April 2024, Armenia and Azerbaijan reached an agreement whereby Armenia handed over four abandoned villages along the border to Azerbaijan: Bağanis Ayrum, Aşağı Əskipara, Xeyrimli, and Qızılhacılı. [262]
Since March 26, 2023, the Azerbaijani government has formalized its blockade of the Republic of Artsakh by seizing strategic ground around the Lachin corridor both within Artsakh and Armenia, installing a military outpost that blocks a bypass dirt road that provided relief, blocking the old section of the Lachin corridor, and installing a checkpoint at the new section. [263] [264] [265] [266] [267] [268] [269] Azerbaijan has ignored calls from the Russian peacekeepers to observe the 2020 ceasefire conditions and return to their initial territorial positions behind the Line of Contact. [263] [270] [265] [266] [271] Azerbaijan has also ignored calls from the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and other international entities to restore freedom of movement across the Lachin corridor. [272]
On 11 October 2021, an Armenian civilian named Aram Tepnants was shot dead by Azerbaijani snipers in the town of Martakert. Russia's Ministry of Defense confirmed the incident and stated that Russian peacekeepers launched an investigation involving both sides. [273]
On 8 November 2021, one Armenian civilian was killed and three wounded as Azerbaijani troops opened fire at Armenians repairing a water supply pipe near Shushi. Russia's Ministry of Defense confirmed the incident and stated that Russian peacekeepers launched an investigation involving both sides. [274] The U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs condemned the killing of the Armenian civilian. [275] [276] On 8 March, it was reported that the only gas pipeline leading from Armenia to the Armenian-inhabited enclave of Artsakh was damaged, as tension spiked in the region following the launch of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The energy supply was reportedly disrupted again on the evening of March 21. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Artsakh authorities have accused the Azerbaijan government of deliberately creating additional humanitarian problems for the population of Artsakh. [277] [278]
On 24 March, Azerbaijani soldiers crossed the Line of Contact and took control of the village of Farukh, using firearms and drones, [279] with women and children being evacuated from the nearby village of Khramort. Russian peacekeepers were reported to be negotiating with Azerbaijan. [280] On 27 March 2022, the Russian Defense Ministry reported that Azerbaijani forces had withdrawn from the village. [281] [282] This statement was refuted by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense. [283] On 30 March 2022, Artsakh authorities stated that Azerbaijani forces were still occupying the strategically important Karaglukh heights. [284] On 15 April 2022 Azerbaijani forces crossed the Line of Contact near the village of Seysulan. Later that day, they reportedly agreed to pull back. [285]
Clashes broke out again in late July and early August 2022. On August 1, the Artsakh Defence Army reported that Azerbaijan attempted to breach the line of contact in northern Nagorno-Karabakh, wounding one soldier. Azerbaijan Defence Ministry denied these claims, and the Russian Defence Ministry reported no ceasefire violations that day. [286]
Over the next two days, clashes erupted again, killing one Azerbaijani soldier, two Artsakh Defence Army soldiers, and wounding 14 others. The international community reacted quickly, with Russia accusing Azerbaijan of breaking the fragile ceasefire and the European Union urging an immediate cessation of hostilities. [287]
According to the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry, Artsakhi soldiers had attacked Azerbaijan army posts in the area of Lachin, killing a conscript. In response, the Azerbaijani army stated it conducted an operation called "Revenge" and took control of several strategic heights in Karabakh. The Artsakh Defence Army accused Azerbaijan of violating the ceasefire and declared a partial mobilization. Following the flare-up, Armenia urged the international community to assist in putting an end to Azerbaijan's "aggressive actions". [287]
On 26 August, the Azerbaijani armed forces took full control of the Lachin Corridor area including Lachin and the villages of Zabukh and Sus as part of the 2020 cease-fire agreement.
On 14 September, the Azerbaijani military violated the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh in the early hours of Thursday. Azerbaijani forces used small arms in the shooting in the region. [288]
On 19 September, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. The offensive ended with the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement and the disbandment of the Artsakh Defence Army. [289] It led to the dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh [290] and the flight of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. [291]
Various countries, supranational organizations, and human rights organizations have called for an end to the hostilities and supporting bilateral border demarcation, respecting the terms of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, and for Azerbaijan to pull back its forces from Armenian territory.
Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, both Russia and the European Union have increased their presence in Armenia along the border with Azerbaijan in order to improve stability of the border and deter offensives from Azerbaijan. [292] [293] Upon Armenia's request, Russia's Federal Security Service expanded its patrols within Armenia and the EU contributed a civilian monitoring mission to Armenia. However, while both entities have deterred the possibility of full-scale warfare, they have been unable to fully prevent Azerbaijan's goals. [294]
Russia and the European Union have criticized each other's presence within Armenia. The European Union encouraged Armenia to seek alternative security alliances given "Russia's alleged readiness to guarantee the security of Armenia has proven to be non-existent." [295] Russia, in turn, criticized the EU and claims it is an effort by the West to diminish Russia's power in the region. [296] In January 2023, an EU official said that there were cases where EUMCAP monitors were turned back by Russian border guards within Armenia, even though they were accompanied by Armenian Defense officials. [293]
The United States is concerned by recent developments along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the detention of several Armenian soldiers by Azerbaijani forces. We call on both sides to urgently and peacefully resolve this incident. We also continue to call on Azerbaijan to release immediately all prisoners of war and other detainees, and we remind Azerbaijan of its obligations under international humanitarian law to treat all detainees humanely. [318] [319]
Azerbaijan has defended its military activities within sovereign Armenian territory using various narratives: claiming that, without formal border demarcation its soldiers cannot be accused of occupation, [131] [138] its soldiers were merely accessing Azerbaijani territory inaccessible due to poor weather conditions, [148] [332] it is responding to Armenian "provocations", [216] [224] [333] [223] and that it is defending Azerbaijan's "territorial integrity". [334] Azerbaijan has also frequently given "Revenge" titles to its military operations against Armenia and Artsakh, claiming that it is exacting retribution for alleged deaths of its soldiers. [335] [336] [337] [338] Azerbaijani media outlets and notable politicians within the country called for occupation of more Armenian land after Azerbaijan's September 2022 attacks, claiming that a "buffer zone" was needed to deter "Armenian provocations." [139] [140]
Various journalists, politicians, and political analysts have scrutinized several of these allegations and consider them unfounded or unverifiable. [208] [209] [210] [211] [227] [229] Political analysts and genocide scholars say that Azerbaijan employs a "mirroring" tactic which is common among genocidal regimes and here "involves accusing Armenia and Armenians of committing the crimes that it itself has committed or is planning to commit." [339] [340] [341]
Commenting on Azerbaijan's May 2021 incursion, Eurasianet noted "while those [Soviet-era] maps were not meant to strictly delineate an international border, they do all appear to show that most of Sev Lake is in Armenian territory, which would mean an [Azerbaijani] attempt to surround it would be an infiltration." [332] According to cartographer Rouben Galichian, Azerbaijan's claims to enclaves within Armenia is inconsistent with Azerbaijan’s Declaration of Independence which claims it to be the heir of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) rather than the Azeri Soviet Republic (1920-1991). [342] [343] [344] [345] The cartographer states that between 1918-1920, there were no enclaves in Armenia or Azerbaijan (including Nakhichevan and Artsakh) and that the Soviets gifted over 3000 square kilometers of Armenian territory to Azerbaijan between 1928 and 1948, including the Al Lakes, [346] [347] territory intervening Armenia and Artsakh, and various slices of Syunik (Zangezur). [346]
Critics have argued that Azerbaijan's September 2022 attacks on Armenia undermined the government's official narrative of "territorial integrity", noting that for the last 10 years Azerbaijan has increasingly promoted expansionist territorial claims against sovereign Armenian territory (distinct from Nagorno-Karabakh). [348] [349]
Borderization refers to the physical demarcation of a border which prevents the free movement of people and goods. [2]
Laurence Broers, South Caucasus programme director at London-based peacebuilding organization Conciliation Resources, wrote "Azerbaijan's attack demonstrated the potential for Armenia to be cut in two, given it is a mere 40 kilometres (25 miles) across at its narrowest point." [350] Laurence Broers also says that Azerbaijan's motivations are to have Armenia formally relinquish any claim to Artsakh: "Baku is seeking to avoid a repeat of the 1990s – where the militarily victorious side, then Armenia, was not able to consolidate its victory into a favorable peace from a position of strength." [51]
The analyst argues that Azerbaijan is using "coercive bargaining strategy" in order to extract concessions from Armenia on various issues, including minefield maps, the Syunik corridor, and that never-demarcated borders allow conversion of dated or ambiguous cartographies into better positions for Azerbaijan. This " borderization", according to Broers, also pressures Russia by showing that Russian security guarantees to Armenia are tractable relative to other issues; testing CSTO collective security guarantees and testing Russia's capacity to broker. [351] Broers further expanded on the theme of "borderization" of Armenia by Azerbaijan in his review published by Chatham House. [352] The tactics applied by Azerbaijan towards Armenia after the 2020 war were described as "borderization" tactics in an article published in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs on June 16, 2021. [353] Joint statement on 17 November 2021 by the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, Marina Kaljurand, the European Parliament's Standing Rapporteur on Armenia Andrey Kovatchev and the European Parliament's Standing Rapporteur on Azerbaijan, Željana Zovko called the military operation launched by Azerbaijan on 16 November 2021 the worst violation to-date since ceasefire agreement, condemning any attempts at "borderisation", as observed since the incursion of Azerbaijani troops into Armenian territory on 12 May 2021. [48]
According to the geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor, "Azerbaijan remains unlikely to launch a large-scale military operation to seize large swaths of new territory in Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia, as less costly methods can enable Baku to maintain progress toward its goals. Each time Azerbaijani forces gain ground, it improves their tactical position — even if those territorial gains only move the de facto line of contact by a matter of meters." [354]
Russia is ostensibly Armenia's security guarantor due to the countries sharing a bilateral security alliance [355] and their joint membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which stipulates that members assist each other in order to protect territorial integrity:
In the case of aggression (an armed attack threatening safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) against any Member States, all other Member States at request of this Member State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary aid, including military."
— CSTO charter, Article 4
However, neither Russia nor other members of the military alliance are providing military assistance against Azerbaijan's offensive. Various political analysts and politicians have said that Azerbaijan's attacks were emboldened by Russia's preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan's military ties with Russia, [356] Azerbaijan's economic ties with Russia other European powers, and Russia's own interest in creating the " Zangezur corridor." [357] [358] [359] [360] [361]
Armenia requested CSTO's assistance two times, following various territorial incursions by Azerbaijan: in March 2021. [152] [153] [154] [155] and in September 2022. The CSTO declined Armenia's request both times. [328] Instead of providing immediate assistance following Azerbaijan's September 2022 attack, the CSTO opted to send a "fact-finding mission" one week later and stated that it did not anticipate sending military aid even before the mission arrived. [328]
The CSTO's inaction in helping Armenia prompted the European Parliament to encourage Armenia to seek alternative security alliances. [295] [298] Nerses Kopalyan, a political scientist, wrote that "The Russian peacekeepers function more like an impotent observation mission than an armed contingent." [362]
Nikolay Bordyuzha, the former longtime secretary general of the CSTO said "the issue is Armenian territory, the ownership of which is not under question," adding that "the entire international community sees this territory as the sovereign territory of Armenia. According to its own documents, the CSTO is obliged to react in the case of an incursion by the armed forces of another state." [363] [159] Neil Hauer, a journalist specializing in the Caucasus points out that Azerbaijan's September 2022 invasion of Armenia occurred only a few days after Russia's forces experienced military setbacks in Ukraine's Kharkiv region and the "CSTO was exposed as a paper tiger." [226]
Various critics argue that the conflict is not being presented in the West in the same light as the Russian invasion of Ukraine despite the fact that Armenia is making democratic reforms against Azerbaijan's increasingly authoritarian state. [364] [365] [366] [367]
Azerbaijan is a major exporter of oil and gas to Europe [368] and, with the aim to reduce its dependence on Russian imports, the European Union signed a gas-supply agreement with Azerbaijan in July 2022, which has been perceived as emboldening Azerbaijan's actions. [350] [226]
However, political scientist, Suren Surenyants, considers it positive that European MEPs have "declared the September military actions [by Azerbaijan] an occupation and did not link this aggression with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict." But Surenyants does not expect Azerbaijan's occupation of Armenia to end without concrete action from the international community: "Azerbaijanis are carrying out engineering work on the sovereign Armenian territory, equipping positions. Not a single international structure, not a single geopolitical center created a situation for Aliyev in which he would be forced to leave these territories." [126]
The EU has attempted to mediate a "peace agreement" between Armenia and Azerbaijan that includes a Joint Border Commission to delimit the countries' mutual boundary line. Commenting on this, Tigran Grigoryan, a political analyst said "What I'm seeing now is an attempt by the European Union [...] to establish a victor's peace at the expense of Armenia where Armenian interests are not taken into consideration at all." [369] The EU has treated both Armenia and Azerbaijan as equal parties despite the asymmetry in military and political power between the countries. The EU's response to the ethnic cleansing of Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh has been limited to vague statements that are bothsidist in nature, without naming the aggressor. [370] Since the 2020 war, every military escalation has resulted Azerbaijani forces gaining ground, which political scientist Karena Avedissian, describes as the "creeping annexation" of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. [370]
Some open source estimates put it at a total of 145 square kilometers (56 square miles) whereas others indicate 127 square kilometers (49 square miles).
Azerbaijan has now occupied roughly 50 square kilometres of Armenian territory since the 2020 conflict.
The latest Azerbaijani attack...resulted in...the occupation of some 60 square kilometers of Armenian territory within two days.
In a statement, Azerbaijan's State Security Service said it had handed over 10 Armenian soldiers who were detained on Nov. 16. It also released 10 soldiers earlier in December. On that occasion, Russia played the mediation role.
Azerbaijan has now occupied roughly 50 square kilometres of Armenian territory since the 2020 conflict.
While Azerbaijan has claimed that this new round of fighting was set off by Armenian "provocations" along the border, it is a pretext that few take seriously.
On 12 May 2021, troops from Azerbaijan temporarily entered the territory of Armenia, which amounts to a violation of the territorial integrity of Armenia and of international law
Since the end of the Second Nagorno Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has regularly violated the ceasefire agreement, provoking firefights with Armenia along the border.
This is now the second time ever that Moscow has accused Azerbaijan of violating the ceasefire, after it called out Baku for its actions on 26 March.
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It has been a long-established pattern that some kind of fighting breaks out and demands the world's attention precisely when Baku is unhappy with the pace of negotiations with Armenia to resolve the conflict.
So long as talks appear stalled, Azerbaijan will likely turn to small-scale violations of the cease-fire to seize tactically advantageous areas in Nagorno-Karabakh, or similar actions along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Baku has used this strategy on multiple occasions since the cease-fire was signed in November 2020 to force diplomatic progress by simultaneously demonstrating and increasing its leverage.
At midnight on Tuesday Azerbaijan launched the largest attack on the Republic of Armenia (unrelated to the line of contact of Nagorno Karabakh) in the entire history of the conflict between these two countries.
The September clashes were the most serious armed incident between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Karabakh war...however, this time the clashes took place along their shared southern border (not the contested region).
It is the first time that Azerbaijan has struck targets in large numbers inside Armenian territory; most fighting between the two sides has previously taken place in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory.
...Azerbaijan launched a series of unprecedented attacks against targets inside southern Armenia this week...
On 18 March, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev declared that 'Armenia must accept our conditions' if Armenians wish to 'live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers.'
It is enough to look at the continuous pattern of diverse threats, ranging from military to economic, made by the Aliyev regime to understand who the aggressor is and what the goals are. For example, Aliyev recently threatened full-scale war with Armenia if the country tries to pursue any international discussions or negotiations about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the thousands of Armenians who still live in their indigenous lands under the protection of the Russian peacekeeping force.
'Whatever will happen there, the border will be where we say it should be. They [the Armenians] know that we can do it. No one will help them, not the retired French policemen from Europe, not others, not anyone else', said Aliyev, apparently referring to the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia.
'Many Armenians believe there will be a spring offensive by Azerbaijan. If this doesn't happen, our mission is already a success,' Markus Ritter, the German head of the monitoring mission, told Germany's Deutsche Welle broadcaster this week.
Unrecognised, undemarcated or otherwise contested borderlines are used as instruments by Russian and Azerbaijani forces, respectively, to destabilise, create 'new realities', and enforce concessions. Everyday livelihoods in the conflict zones are violently disrupted as a result: villagers can no longer safely access farmlands, schools, water resources, relatives or religious sites.
Azeri soldiers routinely fire on Armenian farmers as they tend to their crops, disrupting their daily lives.
All along Armenia's newly militarized eastern border, fearful villagers have stopped using some land that they had previously employed for cultivation or pasture. Incidents of shooting and cattle rustling have become common over the past two years, some resolved through Russian mediation, some not.
Armenian civilians of Nagorno Karabakh and surrounding regions along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border are threatened by Azerbaijan's military and face violence if they try to leave Armenian territory within disputed areas.
For the Armenians who live in the border regions, the effects have been manifold. They have lost access to farmland or pastures they used to use; many have sold, slaughtered, or relocated livestock as a result. Some human residents have moved away, as well, fearing for the future here.
...the border areas between Armenia's Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces, and Azerbaijan's newly established East Zangezur region have become militarised front lines.
...on May 12, Azerbaijani troops entered the Lake Sev region in the Syunik region of Armenia. In total, about 600 enemy soldiers turned out to be on the territory of the republic.
For the Armenians who live in the border regions, the effects have been manifold. They have lost access to farmland or pastures they used to use; many have sold, slaughtered, or relocated livestock as a result. Some human residents have moved away, as well, fearing for the future here.
...many older residents of Syunik from the generation socialized in Soviet times have active and even pleasant memories of Azerbaijani friends and colleagues.
...in the Soviet years it was not clear through which part of the forest the Armenian-Azerbaijani border passes. 'At that time, during the Soviet years, none of the adults knew the border. We knew roughly that this was a forest. We entered, but we didn't know 10–20 meters. Is it their territory that we take out wood from, or is it our territory?' ...The friendship between Inner Hand and the neighboring Azerbaijani Kyollu Razdara is in the past, now the residents of Inner Hand are anxiously following the movement of the Azerbaijanis approaching the village.
The main road connecting the cities of Goris and Kapan in Armenia's Syunik region runs alongside – and in some cases across – the de facto (though not yet formally delineated) Azerbaijani border.
Both sides have said that Soviet maps should form the basis for the future delineation...
Armenia and Azerbaïdjan confirmed their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which both recognize each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. They confirmed it would be a basis for the work of the border delimitation commissions
The Azerbaijan Cybersecurity Center, furthermore, is also in close contact with Google, and as a result of their mutual agreement, they have already achieved success. Asadov stressed that the addition of new Azerbaijani names to Google Maps was carried out due to their efforts.
Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amirabdollahian officially inaugurated the consulate on Friday, making Iran the first country to establish a diplomatic mission in the [Syunik] province that is sought by Baku and Ankara.
At least 50 square kilometres of Armenian territory are now reported as occupied by Azerbaijani forces.
During the two-day war, Azerbaijani forces took control of several positions within Armenia that they still hold.
About 10 days ago, the Azerbaijani military put up five new tents and fortified them in the administrative area of Nerkin Handi, informed the administrative head of the village, Khachatur Baghdasaryan. 'They entered the administrative territory of the village, descended 800–900 meters from their position to our territory. There are five tents, and they are digging trenches.'
Azerbaijan has denied entering Armenian territory, but satellite images clearly show Azerbaijani positions inside Armenia, with forwarded military posts, roads and vehicles.
A #CivilNetCheck visual investigation confirmed, through the study of satellite imagery, that the new road leading to the Azerbaijani positions was built last May. This means that the advance by the Azerbaijani troops into Armenia was concealed from the public for nearly a year.
Local government officials and farmers said Tegh lost a large part of its agricultural land and pastures. Some of them said that the Azerbaijani military made bigger territorial gains than is admitted by official Yerevan.
All this has placed Syunik in the spotlight. Often referred to as "the backbone of Armenia," it is a vital transportation node not only to Nagorno-Karabakh, but to the southern border with Iran. That is one of only two open international borders Armenia has now; the other being Georgia to the north. The borders to the west (Turkey) and east (Azerbaijan) have been closed since the First Karabakh War of the early 1990s.
Over 80% of the former Soviet republic's borders have been closed for more than 30 years, stunting its economic development.
Azerbaijani forces have continued to torture, displace, extrajudicially kill, and forcibly "disappear" ethnic Armenian soldiers and civilians, both inside of Nagorno-Karabakh and in sovereign Armenia, in violation of the ceasefire agreement and international law.
Constant threats to the life and security of the population living in border villages fuelled a sentiment of fear, disrupting their daily lives and undermining the full enjoyment of their human rights...As indicated in the 2021 Memorandum, a number of Armenian citizens have been arrested and detained by the Azerbaijani military forces along the border for alleged illegal border crossings since the outbreaks of hostilities in 2020.
[President Aliyev said] 'In the absence of border delimitation, no one can claim where the border passes.'
Azerbaijani media outlets, including ones close to the government, as well as a prominent Azerbaijani parliamentarian, have called for Azerbaijan to take control of more land along its border with Armenia. Some describe the move they are advocating as defensive, while others appear to see it as additional leverage for negotiations with Armenia.
Following the attack, some Azerbaijani pro-government sources suggested, in what appeared to be a coordinated information campaign, the creation of a 'buffer zone' along Armenia's border with Azerbaijan. "…a safe zone, so to speak, a 'buffer zone,' should be created near the border of Azerbaijan,' according to an analysis in the pro-government report.az.
'A safety zone, that is, a 'buffer zone,' must be created,' said military analyst Uzeir Jafarov in a separate piece on Report.az. '…I believe that the 'buffer zone' should be created in such a way that Armenia does not pose a threat…'
Azerbaijani troops advanced several kilometers into Armenia's Gegharkunik and Syunik provinces on May 12–14.
...starting from May 12, the armed forces of Azerbaijan invaded the territory of the Republic of Armenia in at least three directions and actually entrenched themselves at a depth of several kilometers.
Sev Lake with its eastern, western and southern shores is located in the territory of the Armenian SSR -
Sev Lake with its eastern, western and southern shores is located in the territory of the Armenian SSR –
The ongoing tension, and the current authorities' inability to keep it under control, is no doubt harming Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party ahead of the June 20 vote. That makes it improbable that the authorities are deliberately stoking the tension.
Under a Russian-brokered peace accord signed between Yerevan and Baku to end the conflict, the 21-kilometer section of the road will continue to be used by Armenians under the supervision of Russian border guards until Armenia can build an alternative road.
The blockade lasted for nearly 48 hours and was resolved with the help of Russian border guards, which patrol the Armenian side of the border.
While Azerbaijan maintains that Armenia provoked the latest fighting, geolocation of some of the footage recorded since Tuesday strongly indicates incursions by Azerbaijani armed forces inside Armenia proper.
The most severe test of the West's reaction since the 2020 war began on September 12, 2022, when Azerbaijan launched an unprovoked invasion of neighboring sovereign Republic of Armenia.
...in September 2022, Azerbaijan launched its latest, unprovoked assault on sovereign Armenian territory, with intensive shelling.
This doesn't look convincing, and everyone understands that this was a contrived excuse. No Azeri officials have provided any evidence to substantiate the incursion.
There was little doubt who started the fighting. Azerbaijan initially claimed that it was merely responding to Armenian "provocations" – a claim echoed by its ally, Turkey – but largely dropped this rhetoric in the following days in favor of other justifications.
Armenia's defense ministry reported attacks, starting around midnight September 13, targeting cities all along the southern part of Armenia's border with Azerbaijan, including Vardenis, Sotk, Artanish, Ishkhanasar, Goris and Kapan.
The September clashes were the most serious armed incident between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Karabakh war...however, this time the clashes took place along their shared southern border (not the contested region).
Azerbaijan said there were Armenian "provocations", a claim which cannot be verified. Eyewitnesses describe heavy shelling of military targets and civilian infrastructure in, amongst other places, the village of Sotk and the resort town of Jermuk, whose civilian population was evacuated.
The claim that Armenia is producing antipersonnel mines is a recent development and has not been confirmed by non-Azerbaijani sources. Armenia has denied these claims and stated in a letter to the Security Council, dated 13 September 2022, that Azerbaijan was "disseminating false information...in preparation for launching armed aggression."
[President Aliyev] repeated accusations that Armenia had started the fighting of September 12, a claim for which Baku has not offered any evidence.
After the operation on September 13–14, the armed forces of Azerbaijan were deployed at the main strategic heights in the direction of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border...Today, from these strategic heights, we see with our own eyes the cities of Garakils (Vanadzor), Kafan (Kapan), Goris, Istisu (Jermuk).
...September 2022 saw the worst hostilities since 2020, with nearly 300 soldiers (an estimated 200 Armenians and 80 Azerbaijanis) killed in an Azerbaijani incursion into Armenian territory – allowing Azerbaijani troops to take control of new positions deep inside Armenia – and at least 7 600 civilians displaced from the Armenian provinces.
Azerbaijan took control of swaths of territory around Nerkin Hand, a strategically located border village, during its September 2022 attack on Armenia.
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The following week saw a reconfiguration of road links and military positions in the Lachin Corridor, with Azerbaijani forces constructing a new military post, taking control of strategic heights, ignoring Russian calls to return to their original locations, and seizing land in Armenia around the new road leading from the villages of Tegh and Kornidzor towards Karabakh.
...on March 26, 2023, Azerbaijani troops crossed the line of contact to launch an operation to cut off a dirt road that was providing some relief from the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, in violation of the 2020 cease-fire statement
The Russian Defence Ministry said Azerbaijani troops had 'breached' the line of contact in violation of the 9 November ceasefire agreement, which brought an end to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. They said Azerbaijani forces had taken up new positions near Shusha.
Azerbaijani forces continued to occupy on Monday a strategic hill near the Lachin corridor seized by them at the weekend, further complicating Nagorno-Karabakh's communication with Armenia and the outside world...the high ground occupied by Azerbaijani soldiers overlooks the barely passable bypass road leading to the Armenian border.
Azerbaijani troops redeployed on Thursday morning to more parts of the Lachin district adjacent to the Armenian border, blocking the old [Lachin] corridor section.
The Azerbaijani 'eco-activists' blocking the Lachin Corridor near Shusha (Shushi) have suspended their action following the installation of an Azerbaijani border checkpoint on the corridor. According to identical articles published across Azerbaijani state and pro-government news websites on Friday afternoon, the eco-activists said they were 'very happy with the establishment of a border control mechanism', which they reportedly said would 'ensur[e] transparency, rule of law and safety of traffic on the road'.
The move [installation of a checkpoint] has increased the blockade of Nagorny Karabakh...A checkpoint on the border would give Azerbaijan the ability to stop any cars travelling between Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh.
Russian peacekeepers have been notified of the latest incident, and have stated they are presently in talks with Azerbaijan to withdraw from the area, and "stop engineering work" that Azerbaijan began after taking the position.
Under the agreement, confirmed by both sides and effective from 1 pm (0900 GMT) on Wednesday, separatist forces will disband and disarm and talks on the future of the region and the ethnic Armenians who live there will start on Thursday.
HRW1
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).In an ironic twist, the unarmed European observers in Armenia and the armed Russian peacekeepers have begun to look alike, both preventing full-scale warfare but unable to fully contain Baku's ambitions. The 'Russian peacekeepers,' political scientist Nerses Kopalyan commented sharply, 'function more like an impotent observation mission than an armed contingent.'
Whereas Russia's alleged readiness to guarantee the security of Armenia has proven to be non-existent, as demonstrated by its lack of response to Azerbaijan's continuous attacks even in the light of Armenia's attempt to resort to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); [The European Parliament] Recalls that the clauses of the CSTO were not activated either during the 2020 war or in September 2022, despite Armenian requests; encourages Armenia, in order to ensure better protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to consider the possibility of diversifying its partnerships and potential security alliances with its regional and Euro-Atlantic partners, as its long-standing reliance on Russia and its allies in the CSTO has proved insufficient.
On 12 May 2021, troops from Azerbaijan temporarily entered the territory of Armenia, which amounts to a violation of the territorial integrity of Armenia and of international law
If part of the territory of Armenia is to be taken and our border conditions change, that is, to have a new neighbor, it is not acceptable for us, Zolnouri said.
Any redrawing of the borders is a red line for Iran, Zarif said.
Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amirabdollahian officially inaugurated the consulate on Friday, making Iran the first country to establish a diplomatic mission in the province that is sought by Baku and Ankara.
Tehran has been expressing its support for Armenia's territorial integrity in other ways. Iran announced that it is opening a consulate in the southern Armenian city of Kapan and appointed a consul in August, which was a "clear signal" to Baku, analyst Salar Seifaldini told the Iranian newspaper Donya-e Eqtesadi.
Iran's foreign ministry similarly called on 'both sides' to stop shooting, and offered its own mediation services.
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The next day, Azerbaijan's MFA responded, saying that due to improving weather this spring, Azerbaijani border forces deployed "in the positions of our country".
Azerbaijani government and media have used 'Revenge' titles for military operations against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war.
New Azerbaijan, the official newspaper of the ruling party, published a similar commentary on July 4 under the subhead '[Armenian] provocations lay the groundwork for Revenge 3'...Another attack just two weeks ago was christened Revenge 2 by pro-government media because it followed an incident where an Azerbaijani soldier was wounded...
A soldier was reportedly killed in the process, prompting a military operation by Azerbaijan dubbed "Revenge".
Even one of his military operations, the one that attacked Karabakh in August this year, was code-named "Revenge." Aliyev says that he does not want revanchist forces to come to power in Armenia, but if one looks at what he does, it seems that he is working very hard for just that. His discourse is not one of a victorious statesman ready to turn the page, but a vengeful leader – just look at the trophy park in Baku, or the statues of iron fists representing Azerbaijani military might put up on every occasion...
The attack on September 12, 2022 also undermined the earlier Azerbaijani official line about territorial integrity and international law. Listening to Aliyev's speeches over the last decade, we can detect a slide from a legalist discourse to a discourse emphasizing a primordial struggle between two ethnic groups. At least for the last ten years Aliyev has asserted that "we will return to our ancient lands – to Yerevan, Goyche and Zangezur."
The subject of territorial integrity between Armenia and Azerbaijan is moot. If anything, the Azerbaijani leadership's territorial claims on almost the entirety of Armenia's territory, including its capital Yerevan, and its periodic incursions, and the 2022 invasion and occupation of Armenian territory constitute threats to Armenia's territorial integrity –– not Azerbaijan's.
The international analytics emphasized the important role of Russia in the post conflict period
National Security Council head Armen Grigoryan has said that Armenia is formally in the process of applying for Russian assistance to 'protect the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia' within the framework of a 1997 bilateral agreement.
In February 2022, Azerbaijan signed a 'declaration on allied interaction' with Russia, just 2 days before the full-scale invasion [of Ukraine] – including military cooperation and the possibility of 'providing each other with military assistance.'
After the war in Ukraine, when air, land and sea communications between Russia and Europe have been suspended, Moscow is strongly interested in opening communications through Armenia in order to obtain additional routes of communication with Turkey.
Nagorno-Karabakh, for its part, had a reasonably competitive election in 2020 and is ranked by the watchdog group Freedom House as "partly free". The contrast with Azerbaijan could hardly be more stark.
In the latest Freedom House Report, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia are among the partly-free countries, and Azerbaijan is among the not free countries. How can the leading democratic countries turn a blind eye and throw us into the arms of tyranny?